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Determining who is the right indigenous leader for U.S. forces to work with in a complex 
environment during irregular and unconventional warfare is a complicated endeavor, 
affected by countless factors.  Selecting, vetting, and influencing indigenous leaders in 
foreign countries has been a key task of U.S. Special Operations Forces since its 
inception, but to date Special Operations Forces often struggles with mastering this, as 
evidenced by recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The primary aim of this thesis 
is to improve this capability.  To assist with the future selection and vetting of indigenous 
leaders, this thesis introduces a leader selection heuristic.  It is the authors’ contention is 
that to find the “right” individual requires correctly identifying particular attributes, 
features, and behaviors in both the individual and the environment.   
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PREFACE 
The Operator’s Dilemma: A Vignette Based on Actual Experience  
2010—Captain (CPT) Steele and his Special Forces Operational Detachment-
Alpha (ODA) had just arrived in their new area of operation.  The district that they were 
assigned by their Special Operations Task Force headquarters sat at the intersection of 
the major lines of communication that connected the province to the neighboring 
provincial capitals.  The population appeared undecided as to whether to back the 
insurgency or the government.  Ownership of this key district had the potential to dictate 
who controlled the entire province.  CPT Steele and his team were tasked with 
developing partnerships throughout the district to establish security so that the host- 
nation government could expand its influence in the district and pacify the ongoing 
insurgency.   
No members of the ODA had previously deployed to the district, but they were 
able to generate limited situational awareness thanks to the tribal templates and static 
social network mapping that the Special Operations Task Force possessed of the area, as 
well as a historic ethnographic study of the area.  CPT Steele and his ODA entered the 
district and met with a local whom they believed to be a regional powerbroker.  Haji 
Halim had made initial contact with the team and promised the support of the population.  
The team discovered that he belonged to the dominant tribe in the district.  Haji Halim 
appeared to have a reliable intelligence network that fed the team actionable intelligence 
about the insurgency.  It appeared that the team chose the right partner.   
However, once the team began conducting partnership efforts with local 
communities, several locals began to complain that Haji Halim was not a tribal chief, but 
rather had developed stature due to his association with the insurgency and locals’ fear 
of reprisals.  Increasingly it became clear to the team that he was not considered a 
legitimate authority anywhere in area of operation.  Worse yet, all local chiefs had 
reportedly fled the area or been killed, and the population seemed to want nothing to do 
with the team.   
 xx 
Within a month of CPT Steele and his ODA’s arrival, the situation had changed 
drastically.  The ODAs base of operations received daily attacks.  Civilians fled the area 
as violence increased and daily economic activity skidded to a halt.  Then one morning 
Haji Halim was gone.  CPT Steele suddenly found himself without a partner and in a 
hostile district.  CPT Steele gathered his team quickly, and they re-evaluated the 
situation, analyzing it in light of the information that they had collected since their 
arrival. 
Underlying land disputes within the district were now surfacing. Haji Halim, it 
turned out, was a major producer of opium in the district and had been using his new 
influence to force out competitors.  His elevation from a mid-level leader to one of great 
importance, as a result of American support, changed the dynamic of control in the 
district and united minority factions against the tribe Haji Halim belonged to.  Dormant 
grievances had been reignited and control of the population was being hijacked by the 
insurgency.  CPT Steele and his team had produced the opposite effect from what they 
intended.  CPT Steele had no idea whom he should partner with now in order to achieve 
his mission. 
All he kept asking himself was, “What went wrong?”  The partnership had 
appeared so promising initially.  Haji Halim seemed to be exactly the “right guy.”  Why 
couldn’t he deliver on his promises?  Should CPT Steele and his men have seen this 
coming?  Was there a better way to pick and vet the right partner before deploying to the 
area and lending U.S. support? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As the opening vignette, loosely based on the authors’ Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Afghanistan experiences, suggests, determining who the right indigenous leader 
to work with in a complex environment is a complicated endeavor and is affected by 
countless factors.  Yet, selecting, vetting, and influencing indigenous leaders in foreign 
countries has been a key task of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) since its inception.  
However, to date SOF still struggle with mastering this practice.  One aim of this thesis is 
to improve this capability.  To do so, we will use theory from beyond military doctrine to 
home in on several factors critical to selecting and vetting indigenous leaders.   
A white paper recently released by several U.S. general officers highlights the 
ever-growing attention being paid to the importance of selecting, vetting, and influencing 
the right indigenous leader.  According to the document:  
…the success of future strategic initiatives and the ability of the U.S. to 
shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment…will rest more and 
more on our ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the 
‘human domain…aimed at influencing human activity and the 
environment…be they heads of state, tribal elders, militaries and their 
leaders or even an entire population….1   
The “human domain” is defined as the “physical, cultural and social environments” that 
exist within a conflict.2   
The U.S. military’s two targeting approaches—decide, detect, deliver, and assess 
(D3A) and find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD)—were designed 
for conventional, high-intensity conflict targeting (in the case of D3A) and man-hunting 
(in the case of F3EAD).  Both underemphasize influencing the human domain.3  This 
                                                 
1Raymond Odierno, James Amos, and William McRaven, “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash 
of Wills” (white paper, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2013), 2, 3. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60, The Targeting Process 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010). 
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thesis instead proposes a holistic targeting cycle that focuses on understanding, 
influencing, and exercising control within the “human domain.”  Specifically, this thesis 
offers a methodology for identifying and vetting indigenous leaders.   
No concise process exists to guide operators in conducting non-lethal, population-
centric targeting, let alone population-centric targeting in an irregular warfare (IW), 
unconventional warfare (UW)4, or special warfare (SW) campaign.5  The military has not 
wandered far from the overarching targeting principles in practice since the introduction 
of D3A, although some adaptation has occurred to refine the process to better fit specific 
mission sets, as was done with the development of F3EAD.  Such recalibration may be 
necessary when the target is the population or individuals within the population, and the 
purpose is to influence.   
As U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-60, Targeting Operations, illustrates, F3EAD 
is a sub-set of the D3A process.6  What is required is an option within the D3A process to 
shift the emphasis toward non-direct action (DA), or population-centric and non-lethal 
targeting, focused on influencing a population segment.  This audible is necessary 
particularly because FM 3-60 is primarily oriented around enemy-centric targeting.  Our 
proposed approach fits into the D3A process and consists of five steps: 
1. Map human and enemy infrastructure and terrain  
2. Identify and vet people or groups to target  
3. Design a strategy to influence people or groups  
                                                 
4 Irregular warfare is defined as, “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 
and influence over the relevant populations…[that] favors indirect and asymmetric approaches… in order 
to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” Unconventional warfare is defined as, “Activities 
conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.” Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 144, 289. 
5 Special warfare is defined as, “the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and 
nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures 
and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside 
indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.” The term “operator” 
used throughout this thesis refers broadly to members of Special Operations units that work closely with 
indigenous populations. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05: Special 
Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1−5. 
6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60: The Targeting Process. 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010).  
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4. Employ measures to influence people or groups  
5. Adjust the strategy as necessary based on circumstances   
Abbreviated as an acronym, this becomes “MIDEA.”7 
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
We do not provide an extensive explanation for each step of this non-lethal 
targeting process in this thesis.  Instead, we focus on Step Two of the process, Identify 
and Vet People or Groups to Target.  More specifically, we discuss finding, selecting and 
vetting the right indigenous leader.  The reason we focus on Step Two of the process is 
that while advances have been made in developing the means and methods for mapping 
networks through static social network analysis and developing an ethnographic 
understanding of a social group/segment, one area that remains neglected is identifying 
the right people to “target.”  In addition, too little attention has been paid to how to vet 
individuals and groups for their suitability, given overall mission (or strategic) objectives.  
Leadership is a key component when it comes to influencing, mobilizing, orienting, and 
aligning population segments.  Ensuring a campaign succeeds requires careful 
exploitation of structural and environmental opportunities.   
The overarching question examined in this thesis is, how can the U.S. military 
improve its ability to select and vet the right individuals to influence and/or non-
lethally target?  Our contention is that to find the “right” individuals to stimulate and 
lead a population segment requires identifying particular factors/behaviors that need to be 
present in the individual and the environment, as well as in the relationship between 
those two.  To lead effectively, indigenous leaders will need certain attributes, including 
an understanding of the dynamics of the environment in which they operate.  This means 
operators need to know more than just where an individual belongs in a social network.  
Our belief is that by taking advantage of the factors identified in this thesis, the United 
States military will be able to better influence and control a target population indirectly.  
                                                 
7 See Appendix 2 for a brief overview of the recommended Non-Lethal Targeting Process, MIDEA.  
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C. METHOD 
The body of this thesis will consist of a literature review and an introduction to 
our leadership selection heuristic (LSH) in Chapter II.  As a conceptual frame, along with 
the authors’ personal experiences at the local level, this thesis will draw from three 
bodies of literature: sociology, and social movement theory more specifically; historical 
accounts; and contemporary politics/current affairs.   
The method of examination in this thesis is comprehensive case analysis.  In 
Chapters III, IV, and V we will explore whether the personal and structural resources 
identified in Chapter II played a role in the success or failure of movements led by 
Ahmed Chalabi of the Republic of Iraq (Chapter III), Ramon Magsaysay of the Republic 
of the Philippines (Chapter IV), and Hamid Karzai of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (Chapter V).  In Chapter VI, we present our findings.  Each individual from 
the case studies will be evaluated using the leadership selection heuristic in order to 
further illustrate good and poor choices in selecting and vetting an indigenous leader.  
Trends and key lessons will also be identified across the case studies in order to provide 
operators with “food for thought” when evaluating potential indigenous leaders.   
Through these case studies, we examine three national-level leaders.  These cases 
were selected based on their relevance, the amount of literature available, and the 
ongoing but also unexpected effects of their selection.  No comparable amount of 
material is available about contemporary local-level leaders.  Nevertheless, these 
national-level examples should shed important light on what to pay attention to with 
rising leaders at all levels.  After all, Chalabi, Magsaysay, and Karzai each started small.  
We use our comparisons across these three cases to illustrate the value of the LSH.  
Because we examine the personal characteristics and the dynamics of the environment in 
which all three individuals operate in, it should be easy to see how the LSH could 
similarly be used across individuals at regional or local levels.  Because the LSH is 
designed to assess the individual, it basically is immaterial to the principles required for 
selection and vetting whether an individual is operating at the local or at the national 
level.      
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The significance that leaders play in successful social movements is a key 
component that has been routinely underemphasized by social scientists and military 
practitioners alike.8  From a military perspective, whether operating within the special 
warfare (SW), unconventional warfare (UW), or irregular warfare (IW) realms, 
influencing indigenous populations has emerged as a key requirement for achieving 
mission end states.  However, as U.S. involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
demonstrated over the past decade, indigenous leadership selection and vetting often 
occurs as an afterthought.  In this thesis, we highlight the benefits of the military adopting 
principles found in social movement theory and the sociology of leadership.  Specifically, 
we introduce a leadership selection heuristic (or LSH) meant to assist Special Operators 
in identifying and vetting indigenous leaders with whom to work.   
As Barker et al. point out, in order “…for collective images and ideas, projects, 
forms of action and organization to emerge, someone must propose them.”9  Absent this 
leadership, collective identity becomes hard to form and collective action is unlikely to 
occur.10  Social movement theory can be applied to identify key attributes that will help 
military practitioners determine who is or is not, or who would or would not make, a 
viable indigenous leader/partner with whom to work.  Movement leaders are defined as 
“…strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize [and direct] others to 
participate….”11  In this chapter, we will briefly examine personal and structural 
attributes, forms of authority, and leadership capital, all of which can be used during the 
                                                 
8 Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Clifford Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership 
Dynamics in Social Movements,” Mobilization 11, no. 1 (June 2006): 3; Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and 
Michael Lavalette, Eds. “Leadership Matters: An Introduction,” in Leadership and Social Movements 
(Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2001), 1.  
9 Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, “Leadership Matters: An Introduction,” in 
Leadership and Social Movements, 1–23 (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2001), 5. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Leadership in Social Movements,” in The Wiley 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Soule, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 171.  
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“identify and vet” phase of the non-lethal targeting cycle introduced in Chapter I.  
Building on these concepts, this chapter also highlights how picking the right leader can 
aid in influencing and exploiting the social movement requirements outlined in the 
political process model as explained by Doug McAdam.12     
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY OVERVIEW 
Social movements are defined as “collective challenges by people with common 
purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and 
authorities.”13  Effects of social movements range from raising public awareness, to 
regime overthrow, to developing and expanding post-conflict governance.14  A key facet 
is having a leader (or cadre of leaders) who can fashion a “…shared understanding of the 
world and of their organization that legitimate and motivate collective action,” in order to 
achieve a movement’s desired end state.15 
Most movements occur within the context of established social settings where 
there are recognized leaders and networks of trust, and communication channels, and 
“…emerging movements tend to spread along established lines of interaction.”16  While 
structural social network analysis is a useful tool to identify potential leaders’ locations in 
a social space, it is a static technique that seldom accounts for the ethnographic and 
dynamic nature of how leaders emerge in a fluid and complex social environment.  
Consequently, in order to achieve success, an operator must understand what to look for 
in the environment as well as in a leader.   
                                                 
12 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 51. 
13Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. 
14 Doowan Lee, “DA3800: Seminar on Social Movements and Unconventional Warfare” (class 
lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 8, 2013).  
15Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6. 
16 Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Towards a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” Social Movement and Networks (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 285. 
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C. PERSONAL AND STRUCTURAL RESOURCES 
To develop a heuristic to identify and vet the right leader, it is useful to think in 
terms of personal resources and structural resources, as outlined by Barker, Johnson and 
Lavalette.  According to Barker et. al., personal resources are based on personal qualities 
and attributes including confidence, the ability to synthesize information, construct 
persuasive arguments, communication skills between a leader and a leader’s 
constituency, traditional and cultural capital, and a leader’s skills and capacity in the local 
context.17  They also assert that a leader’s inner circle (or leadership team) is often 
indicative of the success or failure a leader will have.18  Structural resources refer to the 
thick web of communications and links to the layers of people who interact and spread a 
leader’s message and legitimacy, and activate resources (people, money, and supplies).19 
For the purposes of this thesis, we are expanding the concepts of personal and 
structural resources to incorporate a broader application of social movement theories.  In 
our view, personal resources also encompass both Weber’s concepts of leadership 
authority, as well as Nepstal and Bob’s concepts of leadership capital.20  A further aspect 
of personal resources with which to vet the viability of a leader is his education capital, 
which is often higher than the population at large, as pointed out by Morris and 
Staggenborg; this is due to the “ …myriad of intellectual tasks…from framing grievances 
and formulating ideologies ...[to] improvising and innovating, [to] developing rationales 
for coalition building and channeling emotions.”21  We also expand structural resources 
to include environmental conditions, as found in the tenets of the political process model, 
as explained by Doug McAdam.   
                                                 
17 Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette, “Leadership Matters: An Introduction,” 11–12.  
18 Ibid., 19. 
19 Ibid., 13.  
20 For an in-depth explanation of these theories, as well as other SMT theory mentioned in this 
chapter, see Appendix 1.  
21 Morris and Staggenborg, “Leadership in Social Movements,” 175.  
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An important point to emphasize, which both Weber and Nepstal and Bob 
highlight, is that leadership is a relational process.22  Leaders may have sufficient 
personal resources and attributes to seemingly make them strong candidates for a 
leadership role, but whether they will be granted authority depends on their followers.  
Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of an individuals leadership personal 
resources and the structural and environmental resources where he operates. 
 
Figure 1.  Resources as an Indicator of a Leader’s Success23 
                                                 
22 Nepstad and Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social 
Movements,” 18 and Fran Parkin, Max Weber (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 78. 
23 This model represents a compilation of several social movement theorists’ main points and models. 
Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette, “Leadership Matters: An Introduction,” 11–12; Morris and Staggenborg, 
“Leadership in Social Movements,” 175; Parkin, Max Weber (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 78; 
Nepstad and Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social Movements,” 
18; McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970, 51. 
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Figure 1 depicts the array of resources just described, along with the political 
process model.  Identifying personal resources is the first step in activating the political 
process model by injecting the right kind of leadership, with the right relational 
requirements, to be able to exploit grievances and political fractures and alliances, 
organize multiple networks, and shape a powerful narrative. 
Figure 2 represents the intersecting point between the individual and the 
environment that facilitates the movement. 
 
Figure 2.  Relational Requirements: Personal and Structural Resources 
1. Personal Resource Indicators 
In examining personal resources, along with the personal attributes that Barker et. 
al highlight, several traits can be identified in movement leaders (or would-be leaders) by 
looking to Max Weber’s three types of authority and Nepstal and Bob’s concepts of 
“leadership capital.”   
Max Weber’s theory on authority, though a century old, still provides a useful 
foundational framework (see Table 1).  Weber’s concept of authority is based on 
legitimacy, which relies on socialization and the internalization of cultural norms and 
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values, and therefore requires low levels of external social control (or coercion).24  His 
three types of authority are: traditional-cultural, rational-legal, and charismatic.  Though 
Weber identifies “pure” categories of authority, in reality authority may represent a 
mixture of all three types.25  
 
Table 1.   Weber’s Forms of Authority26 
Nepstal and Bob’s concept of leadership capital expands beyond Weber’s idea of 
authority and nicely bridges the gap between personal attributes and a leader’s 
understanding of, and interaction in, his operating environment (see Table 2).  Individuals 
who rise to movement leadership positions and effectively lead movements most likely 
possess substantial levels of leadership capital, in one or more of the following sub-
categories: cultural, social, and symbolic. 27  A key point that Nepstal and Bob make is 
                                                 
24 Kenneth Allen, Explorations in Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World, 3 ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 169, and L.A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 227. 
25 Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought, 227. 
26 See Appendix 1 for a more in-depth overview of Weber’s forms of authority.  
27 Nepstad and Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social 
Movements,” 4−5. 
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that leaders do not have to possess all of these leadership capital characteristics, and these 
forms of authority and capital are not possessed only by movement leaders.28 
 
Table 2.   Leadership Capital29 
Nepstal and Bob argue that Weber’s study of leadership offers descriptive 
categorizations, and does not isolate factors that make people “…compelling and capable 
organizers.” 30  For our part, we consider it important to determine whether leaders first 
possess an appropriate form of authority before they can fully take advantage of, and 
leverage, their leadership capital. 
2. Structural Resources and the Political Process Model 
In order to effectively select and vet a potential leader, an operator must 
understand how a potential leader’s personal resources fit with the environmental and 
structural factors that are present.  An effective leader must be aware of environmental 
conditions and leverage opportunities they present.  This step includes gaining a deep 
understanding of the grievances of a society or social segment and should be a 
prerequisite to selecting an indigenous leader with whom to partner.  This understanding 
                                                 
28Ibid., 5. 
29 See Appendix 1 for a more in-depth overview of Nepstal and Bob’s Leadership Capital. 
30 Nepstad and Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social 
Movements,” 4−5. 
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provides the backdrop to assess whether the leader will be sufficiently well positioned to 
take advantage of the political, cultural, and organizational conditions to manipulate 
portions of the target population to align with the operator’s desired end state.  Doug 
McAdam points out that social movements are political phenomenon and continuous 
processes; his model “…offers a framework for analyzing the entire process of movement 
development….”31  
The political process model provides the means for deconstructing authority and 
motivation mechanisms throughout the population, which is necessary to gain the support 
and participation of the population (see Table 3).32  Essentially, it provides the means for 
understanding the conditional, political, organizational, and cultural mechanics of 
collective action.  Three sets of factors are indicative of the current strength and potential 
for a movement: the level of organization within the aggrieved population, the collective 
assessment of the prospects for success within a population, and the political alignment of 
groups given the larger social environment.33  Just as a leader’s effectiveness depends on 
his followers, the strength and momentum of a movement is a reciprocal relationship 
involving the effects of broad socioeconomic processes, indigenous organizational 
strength, resources, and expanding political opportunities.  Cognitive liberation solidifies 
the bonds between the factors and sustains the movement.  It occurs within a population 
when the current system loses legitimacy and relevancy. When that happens, there is a 
perception of inevitability that the system needs to be attacked to stimulate a desired 
change, and the population begins to believe that it can change the situation.34    
                                                 
31 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970, 36. 
32 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 
Magazine 26, no. 3 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, 2013): 
33.  
33 Ibid., 40. 




Table 3.   The Political Process Model35 
D. LEADER SELECTION HEURISTIC 
It is evident, given a review of applicable theory, that there are identifiable traits 
and characteristics in both the individual (would-be leader) and the environment that are 
necessary, though not always sufficient, for a successful movement to occur.  There are 
often individuals (would-be leaders) and latent networks that already exist that can be 
leveraged to gain influence over a population, either to re-direct an existing social 
movement, or to encourage the development of an effective social movement.36   
                                                 
35 See Appendix A for a more in-depth overview of the political process model. 
36 McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Towards a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” 285. 
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In order to codify the theory into a usable form for military practitioners, we have 
developed a leadership selection heuristic to employ when examining an individuals’ 
viability as a movement leader (see Figure 3).  As there is no “silver bullet” solution for 
picking the right person to lead a movement, this heuristic is meant to serve as a guide to 
navigate the complicated operating environments in which future military practitioners 
will find themselves.  
 
Figure 3.  Leadership Selection Heuristic 
This heuristic is meant to aid practitioners in making more informed “leadership 
selection” decisions, and to better understand some of the benefits and potential 
detriments associated with their decision.  The ratings on this heuristic are not meant to 
definitively rule-in or rule-out any potential leader, but instead point to existing (or 
absent) personal and structural resources that might affect the successful creation and 
implementation of a movement. 
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III. THE BAD: AHMED CHALABI  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of trying to determine how to identify the right movement leader to 
support, this chapter revisits a now infamous individual associated with baiting the U.S. 
into open conflict with Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq.  Many have pointed 
to Ahmed Chalabi as the man who pushed the U.S. into the Iraq War.  Why did the U.S. 
support him during the 1990s, and give credence to him during the run up to the 2003 
Iraqi invasion? Subsequently, why did Washington look to him as a viable leader prior to 
the Saddam Hussein dictatorship being overthrown?   
These are among the questions and points that this chapter attempts to address in 
order to isolate salient takeaways and improve the future vetting of potential partner-
leaders.  
As the following analysis will indicate, Chalabi was a master manipulator, savvy 
politician, and an individual able to strike a chord with Westerners, but to the detriment 
of U.S. strategic interests.  He was Western educated, driven to succeed, and managed to 
create the perception that he had a broad personal network throughout the Middle East 
and Iraq.  Unfortunately, these characteristics were wrongly interpreted by members of 
the U.S. government as qualities that Iraqis would welcome.  Chalabi’s personal qualities, 
along with assurances from him that the Iraqi people would greet the U.S. as liberators, 
that Iraq was hungry for democracy, and that his Iraqi National Congress could quickly 
fill any power vacuum left by Saddam, gave false confidence to U.S. strategists and 
politicians that a quick and stable victory could be achieved in Iraq.  
B. BACKGROUND—WHO IS AHMED CHALABI? 
Ahmed Chalabi is the scion of a once-prominent Shiite Muslim family from 
Baghdad, a family that gained substantial influence and material wealth under the 
Ottoman Empire, during British imperial rule, and subsequently under the Hashemite 
monarchy of Iraq.  Chalabi’s father was once a prominent businessman and respected 
broker among the ruling Sunni and Shiite elite.  He held positions in the Hashemite 
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government, including minister of public works and vice president of the Senate, as well 
as being a Shiite cleric in Najaf.37  During the nationalist coup of 1958, Chalabi’s family 
lost virtually all its wealth and prestige and fled the country, first to Lebanon, before 
settling in Britain.   
Chalabi attended boarding schools in Britain as a teenager.  He attended college in 
the United States during the 1960s: first at MIT, and then at the University of Chicago, 
where he earned a doctorate in mathematics.  From a young age, he proved able to 
maneuver between Western and Middle Eastern circles, with a penchant for seeking out, 
impressing, and courting influential individuals whom he could add to his personal 
networks.   
Chalabi had an early interest in Iraqi politics and possessed a hatred of the 
Ba’athist party.  While in college, he and two of his brothers participated in actions 
against the Baathist regime undertaken from Lebanon, where he worked as a facilitator 
and courier among several conspirators plotting coup attempts.38  
Between 1971 and 1977, he worked as a professor of mathematics at the 
American University in Beirut, and in 1971 he married the daughter of Adel Osserian, a 
prominent Shiite chief and Lebanese politician.39  Iman Musa Sadr, the Iraqi Shiite cleric 
and father of Muqtada al-Sadr (leader of the Shiite Mahdi Army in Iraq), presided over 
Chalabi’s wedding.40  Osserian and Sadr were important role models for Chalabi, as 
powerful men with a penchant for using “…the power of public opinion and tools of 
popular mobilization…” in order to become formative figures in Lebanese politics.41  
While in Lebanon, Chalabi is also reported to have helped provide weapons to the 
                                                 
37 Aram Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War (New York: Nation Books, 2008), 10. 
38 Richard Bonin, Arrows of the Night (New York: Anchor Books, 2008), 21. 
39 Dexter Filkins, “Where Plan A Left Ahmed Chalabi,” The New York Time, November 5, 2006, 
accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/world/africa/03iht-
web.1103chalabi.3388735.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 25. 
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Kurdish separatist leader, Mustafa Barzani.42  He also encouraged the international press 
to cover the travails of Iraqi Kurds under Saddam.43 
Chalabi moved to Jordan in 1978 to assist with his family’s business interests.  
Once there, Prince Hassan, son of King Hussein bin Talal, assisted him in a banking 
venture.44  By his own account, Chalabi “…learned…how the Jordanian system 
works…worked it… [and] reached the top.”45  He turned his banking venture, Petra 
Bank, into one of the most prosperous banks in Jordan, enjoying a tenfold increase in 
assets (from $40 million to $400 million) between 1978 and 1982.46  He also used his 
position and his penchant for networking to become an influential power broker within 
Jordanian high society.   
During this period, Chalabi donated funds to the Shiite opposition in Iraq.47  
While his activities may have become an issue for Jordan, his personal empire, 
nonetheless, collapsed for other reasons.  In 1989, his bank came under the scrutiny of the 
Jordanian Central Bank commission, and failed an audit.  Evidence indicated fraud, 
embezzlement, and over $200 million in bad loans.48  Chalabi fled Jordan to avoid 
prosecution for corruption and bad banking practices, and was later convicted in absentia 
in 1992 (on charges of fraud, forgery, and embezzlement) and sentenced to 32 years in 
prison.49 
                                                 
42 Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War, 27. 
43 Ibid., 26. 
44 David Leigh and Brian Whitaker, “Financial Scandal Claims Hang over Leader in Waiting,” The 
Guardian, April 14, 2003, accessed July 10, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/14/iraq.davidleigh. 
45 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 33. 
46 Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War, 32. 
47 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 34. 
48 Leigh and Whitaker, “Financial Scandal Claims Hang over Leader in Waiting.”  
49 George Packer, Assassin’s Gate (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Publishers, 2006), 76. 
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C. BACKGROUND—AHMED CHALABI AND THE IRAQI OPPOSITION 
1. Failure to Create Conditions for Internal Revolution  
The U.S. had made several attempts to create a viable opposition movement or set 
the conditions for a coup to oust Saddam, before its invasion of Iraq in 2003.  In the wake 
of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Saddam cracked down on the insurrections that 
occurred after calls to rebel came from opposition leaders in the Kurdish north and Shiite 
south, and from President George H. W. Bush’s media addresses.  Even with no outside 
support, opposition groups managed to gain control in parts of 14 out of Iraq’s 18 
provinces and were within a few miles of Baghdad.50  Without external support, and 
because Baghdad’s population remained mostly passive, the regime regrouped and 
proved able to systematically crush the rebels.51  The reluctance of Baghdadis to join the 
revolt was likely due to the absence of an underground network, poor information flow, 
and the lack of cooperation or coordination among resistance elements throughout Iraq.52  
In other words, the population was not properly motivated, organized or mobilized for a 
revolution.   
For its part, the U.S. preferred a military coup to a revolution given fears that Iraq 
would fracture along ethnic lines, with the Shiites then able to gain control of the 
government thanks to assistance from Iran.53  When a coup did not materialize, President 
George H. W. Bush signed a secret finding in 1991 authorizing a covert program to 
create conditions that would lead to Saddam’s ouster.54  The CIA was granted a $40 
million budget to create an organized resistance.55 
                                                 
50 “Flashback: The 1991 Iraqi Revolt,” British Broadcasting Company (BBC) News, August, 21 2007, 
accessed July 20, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm. 
51 Faleh Jabar, “Why the Uprising Failed,” Middle East Report 22, May–June 1992. 
52 Jabar, “Why the Uprising Failed.” 
53 Katzman, Kenneth. Report to Congress—Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime (RL31339) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2002), accessed July 27, 2013, 
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/crs/020322rl31339.pdf, 1–2. 
54 Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War, 72. 
55Katzman, Report to Congress—Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, 2. 
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Having learned from the 1991 uprisings, when Kurds, Shiite, and anti-Ba’athist 
groups rose separately along ethnic and sectarian lines, with no coordination among 
them, the CIA sought to create conditions that would gradually undermine Saddam.  The 
CIA was mindful that if the regime fell too quickly, and under the wrong conditions, it 
could trigger forces that could spin out of the U.S.’s control.56  Essentially, the U.S. 
wanted Iraq to remain “…Arab, Sunni-led, and anti-Iranian….”57  The CIA hoped to 
create enough stress that Saddam would overreact and his overreaction would provoke a 
coup among his Sunni supporters.58  The CIA’s second line of effort was to create a 
unified political opposition, comprised of Iraq’s main constituent groups, “…Sunnis, 
Shiites, Kurds, clerics, monarchists, and former military officers…”59  The idea was that 
by providing sufficient internal and external support, enough criticism  could be stirred 
up about the regime that opposition against Saddam would mobilize.  Thus, the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC) was created in 1992 as an umbrella organization designed to 
serve as a bridging mechanism and unified voice for multiple, disparate dissident groups.   
Multiple dissident groups operated during the 1990s and early 2000s.  Most did so 
outside of Iraq or on the peripheries of the country.  Kurdish opposition groups associated 
with Massoud Barzani (Kurdish Democratic Party, or KDP) and Jalil Talibani (Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan, or PUK) had found shelter with the creation of the northern “No Fly 
Zone” in the wake of the Persian Gulf War.  Iranian-sponsored Shiite groups operated 
from Iran and from southern Iraq (the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq 
(SCIRI) and the Islamic Dawa Party (IDP)).  The Iraqi National Accord (INA), led by 
Ayad Allawi, was another larger group that surfaced in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, funded by Saudi Arabia and later the U.S. and Britain, with small elements active  
 
 
                                                 
56 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 65. 
57 Ibid., 66. 
58 Ibid., 67. 
59 Ibid., 68. 
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inside Iraq during the 1990s.60  These groups, along with monarchists and other 
dissidents, did not communicate with one another in any meaningful way until the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC) was established.   
2. Chalabi’s Involvement in the Creation of the Iraqi National Congress 
Chalabi, who had been actively involved in Iraqi opposition since 1990, was 
initially approached by the CIA’s Whitley Bruner following his flight from Jordan to 
Britain.  Although Chalabi did not have any grass roots constituency within Iraq, or 
among any of the opposition groups, he did have multiple influential contacts throughout 
the Iraqi diaspora and the Middle East, as well as in Washington D.C.61  He appeared to 
be an advocate and organizer with a talent for finance and moving large sums of 
money.62  In the period leading up to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he became 
involved with an Iraqi opposition group, the Joint Action Committee, which called for 
international support to overthrow Saddam,63 and sought a Shiite-led provisional 
government.64 
The CIA’s original intent was for Chalabi to be a behind-the-scenes manager, 
responsible for public relations, handling contacts, and assisting with devising an 
organization and strategy to put pressure on Saddam Hussein.65  The CIA was impressed 
with Chalabi’s skills and know-how, specifically his intellect, public relations and 
backroom negotiator experience, and his “…ideal blend of Western know-how and Arab 
sensibility.”66  According to Whitley Bruner, the CIA planned to cast others as 
movement leaders, and had three individuals in mind: Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, a 
prominent Shiite cleric based in London, and associated with the leadership of SCIRI; 
                                                 
60 Laurie Mylroie, “The US and the Iraqi National Congress,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4, no. 
2 (April 2001), accessed June 28, 2013, http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0104_ir1.htm. 
61 Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War, 70. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 53. 
65 Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War, 75. 
66 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 63. 
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Hassan Naqib, a former Sunni Baathist Iraqi general who defected in the 1970s and 
operated from Syria; and Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, who resided in Irbil in 
Kurdish-controlled Iraq.67  These men each led networks that they could mobilize, and 
each had legitimacy among their constituents based on charismatic, traditional, and/or 
legal authority.   
3. The Iraqi National Congress—Rise  
With the quiet assistance of the Rendon Group, a public relations firm hired by 
the CIA, Chalabi organized a meeting for Iraqi opposition groups in June 1992.68  The 
event, held in Vienna, Austria, was attended by 200 Iraqi delegates.  The meeting gained 
credibility thanks to participation by the KDP and PUK, though the INA and main Shiite 
opposition groups did not attend.  At the meeting, the delegates elected an 87-member 
National Assembly.69 
The CIA’s role in the event was cloaked, and Chalabi played host and sole 
organizer, which enhanced his prestige and catapulted him to being a central figure.  One 
CIA member commenting on Chalabi’s methods said he drove wedges between people 
and developed himself as a bridge holding groups together.70  From John Maguire’s 
perspective, Chalabi was the wrong man for the role he was thrust into, and was going to 
be hard to manage due to his ambition. 71  Several other CIA members agreed and argued 
for pushing Chalabi out of the operation.72  However, Chalabi’s supporters in 
Washington D.C., to include several senior CIA officers, made this unlikely.73 
Chalabi’s role as a central player was further cemented through the money 
scheme used to provide aid to the Iraqi opposition.  He founded the Iraqi Broadcast 
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Company (IBC), which was the only conduit through which early U.S. funding to the 
Iraqi opposition was delivered.74  Because he and a family relative shared 100 percent 
ownership, this arrangement provided Chalabi with control over the CIA’s laundered 
funds and, as a result, endowed Chalabi with a high degree of control over the INC,75  
especially since, between 1992 and 1996, the CIA reportedly provided around $100 
million.76 
Several months after the initial INC meeting, Chalabi organized another INC get 
together in the Kurdish city of Salahuddin.  Several Shiite opposition groups participated 
this time, to include SCIRI and Dawa.  Though this meeting was organized without 
approval from the CIA, it represented an important step towards creating a collective 
movement.  Unfortunately, a collective social revolution remained counter to the CIA’s 
desire for a coup.77  Nevertheless, the INC expanded its National Assembly to 234 and 
developed a charter and claimed the right to establish a provisional government and act as 
a federal authority.78  Its main goals were outlined as the overthrow of the Saddam 
regime and establishment of a democratic system in Iraq.79 
At this Salahuddin meeting, the delegates chose an executive council consisting of 
twenty-six members, and Chalabi was elected to be the council’s executive chairman and 
president.80  Three individuals were chosen for the group’s Leadership Council: a 
moderate Shi'ite Muslim cleric, Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum; an ex-Iraqi general, Hassan 
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Naqib; and Masud Barzani.81  But, as the president of the executive council, Chalabi 
became the de facto leader of the opposition.   
4. The Iraqi National Congress—Fall  
In early 1993, President Clinton reauthorized Bush’s secret finding and expanded 
it to include overt political support for the INC.82  This support emboldened Chalabi, but 
also invited several small-scale attacks by Saddam’s regime against the INC.83  The 
attention from the White House also created tension within the INC with the Iranian-
backed SCIRI.  Ever the strategist, Chalabi saw the need to gain backing from power 
brokers within Iran in order to get the SCIRI back on his side and prevent his being 
targeted by the Iranian regime.84  Consequently, Chalabi traveled to Qom to seek the 
approval of two Shiite marja, or religious scholars, who had known his father.85  These 
individuals granted him approval to fight against Saddam with support from the U.S., 
which gave him the cover that he needed with the Iranian regime.86  Many in the CIA 
began to suspect that Chalabi was a double agent working with the Iranians; more likely, 
he was an opportunist simply trying to work all the angles available to him.   
Chalabi attempted to incite a revolution in Iraq.  However, as the CIA had long 
suspected after observing the INC and other opposition groups, he did not have an 
organization or network sufficiently viable or capable of overthrowing Saddam’s 
regime.87  By 1994, the INC was already losing traction as a unified movement, and 
Chalabi was not working towards establishing a more unified opposition.  He largely 
failed to conduct the propaganda for which the CIA had been paying him, allocating little 
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effort or funding to the distribution of print or radio messages that were supposed to 
suffuse the country, to include Baghdad.88  Focusing on this propaganda effort could 
have made Chalabi the face and voice of the INC and would have assisted him in 
mobilizing grass-roots support for the cause and ensuring the INC was the central 
authority in the larger movement against Saddam, as well as solidifying support under a 
unified leadership.  Instead, Chalabi claimed he already had all the pieces he needed for a 
revolution.   
Perhaps Chalabi felt that unity would come with combat, and that combat would 
suffice as a catalyst to unite all the opposition groups against Saddam.  Or perhaps he felt 
pressured by the scrutiny he was under from the CIA regarding how he was conducting 
business.  Regardless, Chalabi hatched a plan and pitched it to the CIA representative in 
Northern Iraq, Robert Baer, telling Baer that the pieces were in place for the execution of 
an offensive.89 
Chalabi also presented the CIA with a defector, former Iraqi general Wafiq al-
Samarrai, as well as his plan that included a northern and southern push against Saddam, 
primarily using Kurds and members of the Badr Brigade (SCIRI’s Iranian-backed 
militia).90  Chalabi also bribed tribal leaders in and around Mosul to rebel, though this 
scheme fell through because the sheiks backed out.91  In retrospect, by presenting this 
plan, Chalabi was clearly trying to get both the U.S. and Iran to militarily support him.  In 
the end, however, the INC failed to unify opposition against Saddam, and in March 1995 
only Talabani’s 15,000-strong PUK Peshmerga (Kurd militia) and a 3,000-strong INC 
militia conducted the uprising, with neither the U.S. nor Iran lending military support.92  
In the aftermath, despite a resounding defeat by Saddam’s forces, Chalabi’s stock went 
up with Iran, though not with the U.S.93 
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The INC’s failure to collectively organize throughout the 1990s should have been 
proof that Chalabi was incapable of being a unifying leader.  Only a shell of the original 
INC remained once parties withdrew their representatives due to ideological 
disagreements between the groups and the absence of a collective vision; this left the INC 
primarily comprised of Chalabi’s small contingent of supporters and the Kurds.94  
Following the failed armed uprising instigated by Chalabi, and subsequent infighting 
between the KDP and PUK for control over resources and territory, the Iraqi government 
invaded Kurdish held territory in 1996 with 40,000 troops.95   This was done at the 
behest of Barzani to marginalize the PUK.  The Iraqi Army destroyed the INC 
headquarters in northern Iraq and killed around 130 INC members.96  Around the same 
time, the CIA suspected Chalabi of leaking information about a CIA-sponsored coup 
attempt undertaken by the INA, which Saddam’s intelligence foiled.97  The CIA 
blacklisted Chalabi and cut funding to the INC.98  Without resources and with Chalabi 
having lost his links to the Clinton administration, the CIA, and the U.S. State 
Department, all opposition groups turned away from the INC.   
5. Chalabi’s U.S. Constituency  
Although Chalabi failed to become an effective opposition movement leader, he 
succeeded as a lobbyist in the U.S. outside of the CIA.  By making the right political 
contacts, he was able to work himself and the INC, which at this point existed in name 
only, into serving once again as the primary vessel of U.S. support to indigenous Iraqi 
opposition movements.  In late 1991, Chalabi had been introduced to individuals who 
would later become heavy political hitters in the George W. Bush administration.  
Through historian Bernard Lewis, Chalabi met Zalmay Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz, and 
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Richard Pearle.99  From the outset, Chalabi made an impression on these men as the right 
leader for the Iraqi opposition.  They then became the champions of boosting him into a 
central role.  Pearle, specifically, was key when it came to positioning Chalabi to make 
in-roads among members of Congress.     
In 1996, Chalabi, with a team of consultants with experience serving in the U.S. 
government, crafted a propaganda campaign to reestablish Chalabi and the INC as the 
leading proponents of Iraqi opposition.100  Drawing on his own success influencing 
policy in Congress in the 1980s, Pearle told Chalabi that in order to push an agenda in 
Congress, Congressmen and Senators are best influenced indirectly through their 
staffers.101  Chalabi began his campaign by preaching that Iraq was a powder keg waiting 
for the spark to ignite the revolution, and that the INC had a large following and 
“networks” throughout Iraq.102  He pushed for U.S. air support, claiming that there would 
be no need for U.S. ground forces.103  This assertion not only contradicted CIA 
assessments, but also the results of a U.S. Department of Defense war game held in the 
early 1990s, and the very real results of the 1995 uprising that Chalabi himself had 
instigated.104  Also, both the State Department and CIA remained skeptical of Chalabi’s 
credibility and viability as a movement leader and did not perceive him as having any 
significant following within Iraq.105 
Regardless, by making his pitch through the media, with support from Pearle and 
others, and by wooing Congressional staffers who, in turn, worked on several members of 
Congress, Chalabi was able to influence the drafting and subsequent passage of the Iraq 
Liberation Act (ILA).106  The ILA made it U.S. policy to “…support those elements of 
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the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq…” and allocated more 
funding ($97 million) towards this end.107  Chalabi again became a front man for the U.S. 
in terms of its support of an Iraqi-led opposition.   
The bulk of the effort under the ILA was directed toward propaganda efforts.  
Again, neither the CIA nor the State Department put much stock in supporting the INC, 
but even Frank Riccodoni, the State Department’s front man for the ILA, was himself 
very skeptical of Chalabi, and actually convinced Chalabi to step down as the head of the 
INC in favor of serving on a seven man leadership council.108  Most of the other Iraqi 
opposition leaders in exile did not trust Chalabi and saw him as a divisive, deceitful 
person, and wanted him totally marginalized.109  Yet, despite all this skepticism and 
opposition, Chalabi continued his unilateral efforts, using contacts in Congress to get the 
president to release $25 million in aid to the Iraqi opposition, which Chalabi used to 
collect intelligence and to set up offices in London, Damascus, and Tehran to influence 
other governments’ support.110  Then came the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
which represented Chalabi’s biggest break.   
After September 11, Chalabi redoubled his influence efforts and began providing 
intelligence that fed the rationale for why the U.S. should go to war against Saddam.  
Chalabi’s close contacts in the Bush cabinet included Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug 
Feith, among others.111  His contacts in the Pentagon laid the groundwork for a yet-
stronger relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD), regardless of what the CIA 
or the State Department said about him.      
Through vague and unverified information, Americans were led to believe that 
Saddam’s regime had links to international terrorism.  The CIA remained wary of 
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Chalabi and the defectors he presented.112  Also, reports surfaced that members of 
Chalabi’s INC team coached sources to provide false information.113  Ironically, after the 
decision was made to go to war, the INC found itself marginalized from the war plans.  
The Kurds were chosen as the only viable surrogate force for use by the U.S. Special 
Forces during combat operations.  Although Chalabi may never have anticipated U.S. 
boots on the ground in Iraq, once that became a reality, he immediately began lobbying 
for a provisional government to be made up chiefly of Iraqi exiles to be put in place upon 
Saddam’s ouster.114  The CIA and State Department opposed using exiles, believing that 
they would not be accepted by the Iraqi people, and instead pushed for a U.S. led interim 
government.115  Attempting to outmaneuver his opponents, just prior to the 2003 ground 
war, Chalabi traveled to Tehran to gain Iran’s support as their man to lead a newly 
established government in Iraq.116 
In March 2003, several days into the ground war in Iraq, the U.S. found itself 
scrambling to put an Iraqi face on the invasion.  Perhaps not surprisingly, Chalabi was 
chosen as that face by the DoD.117  Chalabi told the DoD he could gather a 1,000 man 
opposition force (though he ended up only raising around 570, mostly Kurds).118  The 
U.S. military conducted a last minute mission and air lifted his element from Iraqi 
Kurdistan to Talil Air Base, 190 miles south of Baghdad.119  Chalabi coordinated for 
several vehicles to be driven from Kuwait to Talil, and ten days later rushed to Baghdad 
without coordinating with any element of the U.S. government.120  Although it was the 
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DoD that helped put Chalabi in this position, many remained fearful that he would 
declare a provisional government against their wishes.121 
When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set up the interim governing 
council in July 2003, Chalabi was appointed by the U.S. as one of 25 Iraqi 
representatives, and served as the president of the council in September 2003 until the 
presidency rotated.  Still trusted by the CPA and DoD at that point, Chalabi was also 
named to head the De-Ba’athification Commission in 2003.  Later, under the Iraqi 
Transitional Government, he served as the interim deputy prime minister and interim oil 
minister from April 2005 to May 2006.  He did not win a seat in parliament in the 
December 2005 elections (his INC received only 0.25 percent of the vote, around 30,000 
votes altogether), and he was not given a post in the new Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite Dawa 
Party cabinet.122   
To further highlight just how little Chalabi resonated with the population, a poll 
conducted in 2004 ranked him as the nation’s least-trusted public figure (even lower than 
Saddam Hussein).123  Also, in 2004 Chalabi was accused of spying for Iran, which 
further distanced him from the U.S.124  Still, despite his background, Chalabi was 
appointed by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as the head of the services committee 
charged with restoring Iraqi utilities and basic government services to Baghdad in 
2007.125  This appointment was endorsed by General David Petraeus.126  Apparently, 
Chalabi’s bureaucratic qualities and ability to maneuver between different groups 
trumped his track record. Eventually, he was removed from this post because he made 
                                                 
121 Ibid.    
122 Filkins, “Where Plan A Left Ahmed Chalabi.”  
123 John Ehrenberrg, J. Patrice McSherry, Jose Ramon Sanchez, and Caroleen Marji Sayej, Eds., The 
Iraq Papers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 166. 
124 Julian Borger, “Chalabi accused of spy codes tip-off to Iran,” The Guardian, June 3, 2004, 
accessed August 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/03/iraq.julianborger. 
125 Nancy A. Youssef, “Chalabi Back in Action in Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, October 28, 2007, 
accessed August4, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2007/10/28/20893/chalabi-back-in-action-in-
iraq.html.  
126 Ibid.  
 30 
little progress, used his position to jockey for political prominence, and was suspected of 
working with the Iranians.127  
D. ANALYSIS 
Although Chalabi was not initially targeted by the CIA to be the leader of a 
unified opposition movement, time and again we see him maneuvering himself into that 
role.  How was he able to do so? 
1. Authority and Leadership Capital 
To explore what type of authority, if any, Ahmad Chalabi possessed that would 
have led people to believe he could become a movement leader, we again turn to Max 
Weber’s three types of authority: traditional, legal, and charismatic.  Though Chalabi’s 
grandfather and father possessed a degree of traditional/customs-based authority in pre-
1958 Iraq, based on their social and religious positions, those honors did not transfer to 
Ahmed because he was far removed from that past and had never personally functioned 
in those roles.  Instead, his family’s heritage and former prestige provided him access to 
elites in the Iraqi diaspora, positioning him to be able to act as a bridge between groups.  
As a secularist, Chalabi had no religious authority, and he had no tribal authority.  Thus, 
Iraqis in the diaspora and within Iraq alike saw him for what he was: a westernized, 
educated, and connected Shiite exile who worked between groups to oust Saddam, and 
could leverage monetary resources.   
Chalabi later tried to use his position in the INC and his relationship with the U.S. 
and Iran to develop a degree of legal authority as a movement leader, which he then used 
to navigate between, and influence, leaders of the Iraqi opposition groups.  This faux-
legal authority, along with his attempt to develop the aura of having charismatic 
authority, was what Chalabi used to gain the leadership of the INC.  His control of U.S. 
funding was the main tool he used to manipulate this type of authority.   
Chalabi possessed a number of the personal characteristics that a movement 
leader should have.  He had the passion for the anti-Saddam cause, was willing to 
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personally sacrifice, had self-confidence, charm, education, and intellect, and was able to 
understand, strategize, and adapt to dynamic shifts in the environment around him.  He 
also had a penchant for back-room dealings and for nominally bringing people together.  
He could navigate between different opposition groups as a go-between, and was 
effective at constructing anti-regime messages for international audiences.  However, 
these characteristics did not translate into his having true leadership capital. 
Chalabi was not accepted by Iraqi opposition groups, and never locally 
recognized by the Iraqi masses.  He was unable to translate his personal attributes into 
leadership capital, though he used his personal attributes to great effect in wooing 
Washington.  In fact, a classified CIA psychological profile of Chalabi concluded that he 
was a narcissist who saw his own ideas as the solution for every problem, which 
undermined his ability to be an effective leader.128 
In terms of cultural capital, one needs to look no further than Chalabi’s ever-
present western business suits to understand that he did not have a full grasp of localized 
culture.  His secular behavior did not jibe with the staunchly religious Iraqi population.  
This failure to connect to the grass-roots level made him an ineffectual conduit between 
local Iraqis and the international community.  Also, Chalabi had very little social capital, 
as his inability to mobilize an opposition revealed.  Additionally, though he held a high 
degree of symbolic capital in the eyes of his U.S. constituency, Iraqis did not imbue 
Chalabi with symbolic capital; in fact, most Iraqis likely associated him with a deficit of 
symbolic capital, seeing him as a corrupt U.S. lackey. 
Along with a deficit in symbolic capital, Chalabi never held any charismatic 
authority over Iraqis.  As Weber emphasized, charismatic authority does not hinge on 
what the leader alone projects, but depends on how his constituency regards or validates 
his authority.129  This is the error that many throughout the U.S. government made.  They 
became enamored by Chalabi’s engaging personality, his passion, his knowledge, and his 
connections: given these, he had to be a viable leader.  But, while Chalabi may have had 
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charisma, he still did not possess the characteristics of charismatic authority.  What he 
specifically lacked was the emotional connection or symbiotic relationship with would-be 
followers; there was no mutual attraction.    
Another of Chalabi’s shortcomings was his divisive manner, playing groups 
against each other and positioning himself as the sole broker as his means to attain and 
maintain power.  A leader seeking to unify opposition groups needs to be a consensus 
builder.  Chalabi was more concerned with positioning himself in authority versus putting 
his considerable talents to use building a unified opposition.  As Bruner observes, “…if 
you’re as clever as Ahmad you set up [a situation] that you can manipulate to your own 
advantage…He usurped the whole thing!”130   
Instead of driving wedges to advance his own standing, Chalabi should have 
worked endlessly to create bridges among the existing groups and to widen the base of 
the social movement.  As one CIA officer pointed out, “…Ahmad is not about creating a 
wonderful democratic Iraq…[h]e’s about creating an Iraq in which he is in charge.”131  
Chalabi’s eagerness to be in charge, and his personal capacity for the position, never 
translated into an ability to energize a cohesive opposition, and he was never treated by 
Iraqis as an “inside” leader.   
2. The Environment: Expanding Political Opportunities 
As evidenced by the level of participation in the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi 
regime, system strain existed in Iraq, with mass socioeconomic, and social, political, 
cultural, and historical grievances.  Opposition structures ripe for mobilization existed on 
the periphery in the form of the multiple opposition groups, many of which included 
former Ba’athists.  Other pre-existing networks could be found in tribes and through 
mosques, though these also reflected social divides and traditional fault lines.132  Tribal 
society is one of the most important environmental considerations in Iraq.  Tribalism and 
                                                 
130 Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 75. 
131 Ibid., 115. 
132 Hamid Hussein, “Broken Wings—Story of Iraq,” Defense Journal 6 no. 11 (July 2003), accessed 
July 15, 2013, www.defencejournal.com/2003-07/opi-b.html. 
 33 
patronage permeate government institutions and political parties, which is important in 
mobilizing grass roots level consensus.133  Meanwhile, outside support to the opposition  
 
from multiple countries was available to varying degrees.  Taken together, these factors 
made 1990s Iraq ripe for social revolution if at least some of the existing environmental 
constraints could be overcome.   
At the same time, without overcoming these differences, any post Saddam regime 
had the likelihood of becoming a messy affair with the potential to devolve into a strong-
man/strong-party system.  Again, the right person could have made use of a broad 
opposition, which then might have proved truly transformational.  Though Chalabi was 
ever the strategist and opportunist, he focused on external factors and ignored trying to 
shape the dynamics that existed within or among the opposition groups, never mind 
trying to expand to include other social segments.   
3. The Network: Indigenous Organizational Strength 
The disparate groups that existed were separated along ethnic and religious lines; 
any cooperation that existed was unnatural and had to do with gaining access to 
resources.  As the umbrella opposition group, the INC had the potential to act as the 
bridging mechanism.  But the INC never had the structural preconditions to become an 
effective movement.  This was primarily because the networks did not have natural and 
overlapping social/communication channels, or sufficient connective tissue, and because 
no leaders emerged to bridge those gaps.  Further, Saddam was able to effectively 
maintain control and root out much of the underground opposition that did emerge 
through arrests, purges, social and economic oppression, and tribal pandering.  Saddam’s 
effectiveness likely made the disparate groups much more suspicious of each other.   
Given Chalabi’s background, he may have seemed the ideal bridge, not only 
between existing opposition movements but to external sources of support.  Through his 
family history, previous experiences, and his relationships across the region, there was 
much to leverage.  Chalabi seemed – and certainly portrayed himself – as a central figure.  
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Creating a network that could be turned into an overarching and effective movement is 
always daunting and would have taken time to develop, but Chalabi was in position to 
play a seminal role.  However, throw in his personal ambitions and he didn’t stand a 
chance as a credible unifier. 
4. Cognitive Liberation 
Unlike successful movements, the INC was unable to grow into a coherent force 
against the regime, in part, because it lacked a unified vision or identity.  Often unity can 
be attained through strategic framing and by developing a bonding narrative.  What the 
INC lacked was a singular voice or a leader who could rally the disparate opposition 
groups that existed.  Each group had its own vision of the end-state it sought; but they 
never coalesced to share either a collective vision or identity. 
5. Leadership Team  
Reviewing Chalabi’s leadership team also reveals why he was ineffective as a 
movement leader.  Members of Chalabi’s inner team, who should have been integral to 
helping him project his influence, develop a cogent strategy, develop movement unity, 
and construct appropriate frames and narratives, did not constitute a blend of 
personalities suited to effectively represent or influence a broad constituency.  His team 
was unrepresentative of the social groups that the movement was trying to organize and 
mobilize. 
Chalabi’s inner circle included a Kurdish Shiite who was associated with Barzani; 
an Arab Shiite Iraqi exile who had resided in London and was the son of an opposition 
member in Iraq killed in the 1980s by Saddam; an American, originally hired by the 
Rendon Group, who supported Chalabi’s lobbying efforts in Washington; and a Briton of 
Pakistani decent, a Zoroastrian, initially hired by the Rendon Group for public 
relations.134  As several Iraqi Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds noted, Chalabi’s inner circle 
presented significant problems, and many questioned why Chalabi allowed himself to be 
                                                 
134 Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War, 88−91 and Bonin, Arrows of the Night, 119. 
 35 
influenced by so many non-Iraqis.135  It should not be surprising that Chalabi’s decisions 
and strategies were thus met with skepticism and resistance.   
6. U.S. Perceptions: The Right Audience for Chalabi’s Charisma 
Chalabi’s personality and projection of prowess resonated with Westerners.  
Chalabi seemed to always be present and proactive, always had a plan that he could 
articulate –in English and in an educated, cogent manner– was driven and seemingly 
motivated by the right cause, was an effective lobbyist, and said the right things that he 
knew would stir Westerners to action.  Almost all Westerners could relate to him, at least 
initially, even when presented with contradictory evidence about him.   
Beyond the fact that the 20 page CIA profile of him was formally damning, CIA 
agent John Maguire points out that there was a more basic reason Chalabi needed to be 
rejected: he could not achieve the tasks the U.S. required of him, as demonstrated through 
his long track record of failure.136  Chalabi had been vetted by the CIA and the State 
Department, albeit ineffectively initially and, over the course of his relationship with 
them, was found to be unreliable, with no following in Iraq.137  Nevertheless, other 
Americans in Washington fell into the trap of believing that he was the exact right leader. 
7. Effects of Backing the Wrong Man 
Chalabi created a divisive environment within the INC and was unable to 
effectively mobilize a unified movement.  His allegiance to the U.S. was questionable, 
and he had a penchant for defying and going beyond what the U.S. planned for him and 
coached him to do.  Through his independent actions, he often acted against U.S. 
interests.  It was clear early on that his goals diverged from those of the U.S., despite both 
parties’ mutual distaste for Saddam’s regime.  But he was still given access and resources 
by players in the U.S. who enabled him to manipulate the U.S. system.  The access he 
gained to U.S. policymakers helped him skew reality on the ground in Iraq and lent 
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flawed intelligence more credence than it deserved.  In post-2003 Iraq, he was principally 
responsible for the errors in De-Ba’athification, and for creating other political frictions 
in Baghdad.  
Part of the problem with the U.S.-Chalabi relationship may have lain with the 
CIA’s original plan for Chalabi, and the way he was originally managed.  If the aim was 
to use him to generate friction against the regime, there should not have been any effort 
to create a collective movement.  The CIA could have used Chalabi and others agents as 
conduits in order to fund and motivate what were already separate movements that then 
could have continued operating independently.  The margin of success would have 
remained small, while still creating a thorn in the regime’s side and causing Saddam to 
lash out.   
E. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
Chalabi offers an extreme example, highlighting many of the points to consider 
when choosing a movement leader.  As this case illustrates, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to manufacture the conditions for an outsider to become an authoritative 
movement leader.  To many Americans, Chalabi was available, visible, a squeaky wheel, 
a willing participant, and had many impressive and sought after personal attributes.  But, 
he was only able to gain traction as a movement leader (and only to a small degree) by 
being divisive and manipulative and through resources provided to him, not by 
manufacturing consensus or being a driving force for movement unity.  Without delving 
too far down the rabbit hole of which Iraqi, if any, represented a more viable option in 
Iraq, suffice it to say the evidence presented here highlights several reasons why Chalabi 
was not that individual.   
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IV. THE GOOD: RAMON MAGSAYSAY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States partnership with the Philippine government in the 1950s and 
the decision to work through Ramon Magsaysay was an extremely successful 
undertaking.  The partnership provided the United States with the means to pursue a 
limited engagement in the Philippines, utilize relatively minimal resources, and assist in 
the development of a strategic partner while simultaneously rolling back communist 
advances in a strategic location.  But why was Ramon Magsaysay such a good choice for 
the United States?  What among his personality traits identified his potential for success?  
After his initial selection as a partner, what feedback affirmed/confirmed that he was the 
right choice and that further development was warranted?  This chapter will look at both 
Magsaysay’s personal resources and analyze his fit with the political process model.   
Ramon Magsaysay faced a daunting challenge as the Secretary of National 
Defense of the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion.  He was able to defeat the rebellion 
by developing a counter-social movement in support of the government and by 
eliminating support for the rebellion.  His previous experience as a guerrilla leader in 
World War II provided him with invaluable experience and the ability to understand an 
insurgent’s point of view.  Magsaysay possessed positive leadership traits, had a sense for 
existing socioeconomic factors, knew how to build and co-opt existing indigenous 
organizational networks, was adept at taking advantage of political opportunities, and 
proved capable of developing a comprehensive narrative while providing the population 
with cognitive liberation. 
B. BACKGROUND—WHO WAS RAMON MAGSAYSAY? 
Ramon Magsaysay was born in 1907, in Iba, Zambles Province, on the northern 
Island of Luzon in the Philippines.  Magsaysay’s maternal and paternal lineages were 
Castilian and Filipino.  Magsaysay’s mother’s family relocated from Samar in the 
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Visayas to avoid Moro raids, while his father’s family resided in western Luzon.138  
Magsaysay was raised to value both hard work and honesty.  He worked manual labor 
jobs as a child with his father to help him open a family blacksmith shop.139  Thanks to 
his father’s frugal and stern rule, the family achieved middle class status.  Even so, 
Magsaysay still had to work to pay his way through college.  After graduating, he landed 
a job managing a bus company in Zambles Province. 
Following the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941, Magsaysay joined an 
anti-Japanese guerrilla organization in Zambles.  He became influential in the insurgency 
by providing the resistance with transportation assets thanks to his access to the bus 
company for which he previously worked.  Magsaysay’s role within the resistance earned 
him recognition from the American military in the Philippines.  The United States 
rewarded his efforts by making him the Zambles provincial military governor following 
the province’s liberation from the Japanese.  Magsaysay’s appointment as military 
governor jump-started his political career and endeared him to the populace of Zambles.  
His position allowed him to act as a conduit for American supplies and relief efforts that 
greatly increased his influence over the population.140 
C. THE PHILIPPINES POST WORLD WAR II AND THE RISE OF THE 
HUKS 
The Philippines found itself in a state of disarray following four years of Japanese 
occupation and the subsequent recapture of the archipelago by the United States during 
World War II.  The United States recognized Filipino independence on July 4, 1946, 
which left the newly independent country facing the daunting challenge of 
simultaneously constructing a new government while establishing and exercising control 
over the numerous armed groups that had previously fought the Japanese.  Years of 
warfare provided readily available stockpiles of weapons and able guerrillas.  Bandits 
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plagued the countryside.  Illegal armed groups provided the rule of law in locations 
where the Filipino government lacked the ability to exert its authority.141 
The largest and most violent of these armed groups was the Huks.  Huk is a 
Tagalog nickname for the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or the People’s Anti-
Japanese Army, a resistance force created by the Filipino Communist party in 1942 to 
rally patriotic Filipinos against the Japanese.142  The Huks:  
…created a clandestine civil administration in the towns and barrios 
(hamlets) of provinces where their forces operated.  Its base structure was 
the Barrio United Defense Corps (BDUC) with a membership of five to 
twelve persons in each barrio, depending upon its size; the BDUC carried 
out recruiting, intelligence collection, supply, and civil justice.143   
The Huks’ access to the population and their placement within positions of 
influence in the barrios resulted in their unwillingness to relinquish their positions after 
the Japanese were defeated.  The alternative government they established along with their 
geographic proximity to their supporters granted them greater influence over the people 
of Huklandia (the media’s term for the Huk controlled region of Luzon) than the federal 
government had from the Philippine capital of Manila. 
The Huks’ communist leaders positioned themselves to seize control of the 
Philippines following its independence from the United States.  The Communists first 
began their influence operations by seeding elected officials into the Filipino Congress. 
They also used their armed goon squads to manipulate election outcomes and control the 
population.  By 1946: 
…six Huks, including their military leader, Taruc, were elected to 
Congress.  However, they were not allowed to take their congressional 
seats because of charges of fraud and terrorism in the election.  Taruc and 
the others went back to the hills, reactivated the Huk guerillas, and set out 
to conquer the Philippines by force.144   
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Huk guerrillas began attacking police stations.  They initiated a robbery and 
kidnapping campaign, and commenced a systematic assault of governmental locations 
throughout Luzon.   By the end of 1946, the Huks’ surge in activity led to an increase in 
the number of recruits from the areas that they controlled.145  Their conviction that the 
government could not be seized via democracy was reflected in their movement’s motto 
“to change the government with bullets, not ballots.”146  So began the Huk Rebellion. 
1. The Adviser—COL Edward Lansdale 
Colonel (COL) Edward Lansdale was assigned to the Joint United Stated Military 
Advisory Group—Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL) in 1950 after a by-name request from 
Filipino President Elpidio Quirino.147  COL Lansdale had previously served as the 
deputy G2 of the Army Pacific/ Western Command in the Philippines following World 
War II.  His intelligence collection during that period yielded volumes of reports that 
analyzed both the human terrain and the Filipinos’ social structures in the wake of the 
war.  His reports were shared with the new Filipino government and he was widely 
considered by both Americans and Filipinos alike to possess a thorough understanding of 
the intricacies of Filipino culture.   
COL Lansdale collected information both by receiving official Filipino military 
briefings and by traveling across the countryside to canvas the opinions of the population 
in the affected areas.  Rural Filipinos in Luzon felt disenfranchised.  In their view the 
Filipino government was run by a nepotistic and corrupt regime.  The situation worsened 
as the Huks gained increasing control over the region and elite involvement in Central 
Luzon diminished.148  Disgruntled landless peasants, confronted by exorbitantly high 
interest rates and predatory lending practices, were begging for help. 
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COL Lansdale had the challenge of finding the right Filipino leader with whom to 
align himself.  General Armando Castaneda, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP), proved to be a short-sighted military commander who was overly 
reliant on kinetic operations against the Huks.  COL Lansdale believed that General 
Castaneda was too resistant to changing the AFP’s operational design and activities to 
effectively counter the Huks’ growing influence.  In addition, COL Lansdale felt that the 
AFP’s kinetic-centric strategy was good for “showmanship, but it wasn’t defeating the 
Huks.”149  COL Lansdale needed an influential Filipino who would be open to a different 
approach. 
D. VETTING FOR PARTNERSHIP—MAGSAYSAY’S LEADERSHIP 
TRAITS 
1. Authority and Leadership Capital 
Ramon Magsaysay possessed authority traits as a leader.  He provided COL 
Lansdale with a contrasting personality to General Castaneda.  Magsaysay possessed 
legal authority because he was a Filipino congressional leader who had a thorough grasp 
of military affairs from having served as the Chairman of the House National Defense 
Committee.150  Additionally, Magsaysay had been appointed as the Filipino Secretary of 
National Defense in September 1950, just before COL Lansdale’s arrival.151 
Magsaysay’s traditional/relational authority, which may have initially appeared limited, 
was actually beneficial in a national setting; he lacked deep tribal ties to any region as a 
result of his family’s frequent relocation throughout the Philippines.  The fact that the 
tribal system in the Philippines had eroded also helped.  His lack of tribal/ relational 
appeal was compensated for by his standing as a successful guerrilla leader and his 
general appeal as a man of the people.  
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Magsaysay’s military experience was looked down upon by the higher echelons 
within the AFP.  General Castaneda viewed Magsaysay as a mere politician who should 
not meddle in military operations.152  In contrast, COL Lansdale was attracted to a 
number of Magsaysay’s personal qualities, even though Magsaysay did not initially have 
total/complete authority over the military as the Secretary of National Defense.  What 
Magsaysay lacked in charismatic authority in 1951, he made up for with pure charisma.  
COL Lansdale saw that Magsaysay’s charisma could be developed into charismatic 
authority through a robust information campaign and by ensuring the military paid 
attention to the populace’s concerns.  COL Lansdale’s intuitive understanding of Filipino 
culture allowed him to identify Magsaysay’s strengths and see his potential as a leader 
against the Huks. 
The Huks needed to be separated from their supporting population in order for the 
federal government to squelch the insurgency.  The Huks were able to continue to 
replenish their numbers regardless of the AFP’s continuous offensive operations in 
Huklandia.  Magsaysay understood that the root conditions that allowed the insurgency to 
flourish needed to be neutralized if any gains were to be made by the federal government.  
He realized that perceptions of local political office holders, the military, and the 
government overall needed to change.  The military had to become the protector of the 
people rather than a source of corruption.  Magsaysay realized that rural peasants of 
Luzon were attracted to the Huks thanks to three broad socioeconomic factors: social 
justice, land for poor rural farmers, and negative perceptions of the government. 
2. The Environment: Broad Socioeconomic Factors 
A large divide existed between peasants and rich landowners within the 
Philippines following the country’s independence.  Legislation attempted to narrow the 
gap.  Laws were designed to improve conditions for tenant farmers.  However, large 
landowners were able to influence local courts and negate the intent of the laws.  
Unfortunately, the laws did little to change public and private morality and “…corrupt 
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public officials reduced many government programs to ineffectiveness and the gap 
between the rich and the poor became wider.”153 
Magsaysay used the military to neutralize the elite’s unfair influence and its 
tampering with the legal system.  Magsaysay ordered the AFP’s Judge Advocate General 
Corps (JAG) to act as public defenders for poor farmers who could not afford legal 
counsel against rich land owners.154  The military’s representation of tenant farmers 
neutralized any unfair influence that landowners held over local courts.  The result was 
that, “…given back their dignity as men, the farmers lost the temptation to help the Huks 
pull down the whole system.  The system was shown to be good when it was made to 
work properly.”155 
The Army JAG representing the tenant farmers served both as a physical and 
symbolic demonstration of a changed military.  Acts like this assisted in changing 
perceptions about the government and helped to eliminate a crucial recruitment 
demographic for the Huks. 
The landless poor not only received legal assistance from the military but also 
were given tracts of government land through programs started under Magsaysay.  The 
Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program began in December 1950.  The 
program grew out of a brain-storming session as Magsaysay and his staff tried to identify 
a way to rehabilitate Huk fighters and provide them with an opportunity for a better life.  
Magsaysay identified government land that was in the public domain and ready for 
homesteading.  He would then: 
…grubstake a group of settlers on this land, the settlers being retired or 
near-retirement soldiers and their families along with former Huks who 
were neither indicted nor convicted by civil courts and who desired to be 
reeducated in the democratic, peaceful, and productive way of life.156 
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The settlers received 15 to 20 acres, a carabao (Filipino ox used for farm labor), 
and farming equipment with which to work their new plot.  Successful settlers who 
improved their land would receive the deed to it.  Some of the new land owners would 
then be taken back to their home areas in Huklandia to describe and advertise the 
opportunities available to them by working with the government.  Promotion of the 
program by former sympathizers resulted in a multitude of Huk fighters surrendering.  
Magsaysay also audaciously emplaced an EDCOR village in San Luis, Pampanga, which 
was the home village of Luis Taruc, the leader of the Huk rebellion.157  The residents and 
the government working together led to the Huks losing their primary base of support.  
The program was wildly successful since, “it lay close to the heart of the campaign 
against the Huks and was cited by many of them as their main reason for 
surrendering.”158 
Even though social justice and land reform posed important challenges, 
government corruption was widely viewed as the biggest problem that Magsaysay faced.  
The Filipino government was apathetic towards living conditions outside of Manila.  Few 
politicians were concerned with sub-standard housing conditions or the rapid expansion 
of slums.159  The AFP and local government officials alike preyed on the Filipino people 
by running extra checkpoints on roads and charging new fees to pass through them, 
stealing livestock, confiscating individual property, and charging excessive fees for 
government services.  Filipino citizens felt that “license to abuse, arrest, and kill in the 
name of peace and order was particularly rampant.”160 
Magsaysay’s first task was to reorganize and retrain the military.  The military’s 
reliance on offensive, direct action proved ineffective in retarding the growth of the Huks 
and reversing their influence over the population.  A change of strategy was needed and 
this meant a restructuring of the armed forces.  Magsaysay sought for the government to 
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win “the respect and co-operation of the civilians.  This meant a new and different 
approach by officers and soldiers.”161  The Filipino government was going to have to 
adjust its policy from offensive engagements to instead dealing justly and humanely with 
the Huks.162 
Magsaysay supported the military with increased logistical support, supplies, and 
appropriations, yet demanded the fair treatment of Huk prisoners.163  Members of the 
military received pay and allowance increases that enabled them to buy their own food 
and eliminated the necessity to forage and steal from the locals.  In Magsaysay’s view, 
the shift in the public’s perception of the military was as important to combating the 
rebellion as were specific tactical victories.   
Magsaysay also orchestrated a broad organizational design change that integrated 
the constabulary with the army and created a unified command.  Thanks to a 
recommendation by COL Lansdale and General Leland Hobbs (JUSMAG Chief of the 
Philippines) to President Quirino, Magsaysay was granted virtually unlimited authority 
over the military.164  President Quirino conveyed this in the form of a presidential memo.  
Magsaysay thus had the ability to reassign officers, appoint officers for promotions or 
battlefield commissions, act as the approval authority for all officer promotions, and court 
martial anyone in the military deemed to be behaving dishonorably.  Old, non-
conforming officers were retired or forced out of the military establishment.  In 
Magsaysay’s view, it was imperative to rid the military of, “unjust favoritism and of 
slovenly and corrupt practices.”165 
Magsaysay and COL Lansdale conducted countless unannounced unit 
inspections.  These inspections provided them with the opportunity to not only see what 
was happening on the ground, uncensored, but such visits also served to instill the fear of 
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a surprise inspection into every military unit.  The inspections, coupled with Magsaysay’s 
new authority, transformed the military into a more socially aware, professional fighting 
force.  The surprise visits also had an effect on local government officials.  Officials 
started to fear Magsaysay showing up unannounced, and thus began to run their agencies 
with less graft.166  Perceptions about the government rapidly changed while, “…the 
change in the military proved to be one of the critical factors in the defeat of the guerilla 
Huks.”167 
3. Political Maneuver Space: Expanding Political Opportunities 
Magsaysay proved particularly adept at being able to identify and maximize 
political opportunities.  He found a key Huk leader who had grown disenchanted with the 
Huk Politburo.  This high ranking party member was Taciano Rizal, Dr. Jose Rizal’s 
grand-nephew.  Dr. Jose Rizal was one of the Philippine’s greatest national heroes.  He 
led the revolt against the Spanish and was killed by firing squad in 1896.  Magsaysay 
understood the importance of using such a high profile defection and the positive 
publicity the government would gain from Taciano Rizal’s reconciliation.168 
Thanks to information given to them by Taciano Rizal, Magsaysay and his staff 
were able to locate and roll-up the Huk Communist Party Politburo in Manila.  Rizal told 
Magsaysay that, “… if his agents would follow a woman courier, delivering Huk 
messages at the bottom of her grocery bag, they would know where the Politburo leaders 
were.”169  This tip resulted in 22 targets being raided and the arrest of 105 Communist 
Party members.  Manila’s entire Politburo was captured, an operation that resulted in the 
loss of the Huks’ entire urban apparatus effectively severing communications between 
the movement’s rural elements and its Manila-based supporters.170 
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4. The Network: Indigenous Organizational Strength 
Magsaysay projected the kind of charismatic authority that allowed him to forge 
bonds between multiple groups within Filipino society and orient them towards a 
common goal.  He was able to develop a pseudo-social movement within the Philippine 
government.  He accomplished this by being able to first identify and then gain group 
support for his cause by not only eliminating corruption, but by elevating the living 
conditions of the Filipino people.  Magsaysay was able to develop his network and 
achieve his goals by utilizing three specific groups: mid-level leadership in the military, 
the leadership of the Filipino Catholic Church, and influential business groups, 
particularly members of the local Chinese community. 
Magsaysay proved able to circumvent traditional powerbrokers in the military by 
dictating officer moves and promotions.  He scorned military commanders who attempted 
to promote officers who lacked combat experience and made sure “performance in the 
field received special recognition.”171  Magsaysay endeared himself to mid-level officers 
by allowing and encouraging them to innovate.  He supported ideas that officers believed 
could positively affect the war.  Mid-level officers became enthusiastic supporters of his 
policies as a result.  The EDCOR program, numerous tactical psychological operations, 
and the idea for the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) originated from collaboration with mid-
level officers.   
As already mentioned, EDCOR participants were sent back into enemy-held 
territory to promote the program.  Specially designed aircraft would fly over Huk areas 
and broadcast messages from family members, imploring Huk fighters to surrender and 
begin the reconciliation process with the government.  The CAO was critical to this 
effort.  It would “…not only perform combat psywar, but would also improve the attitude 
and behavior of the troops towards civilians—those masses whose loyalty is the 
imperative stake in a people’s war as waged by the Communists.”172 
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In witnessing the struggle between the Catholic Church and the Huks, Magsaysay 
saw further opportunity to isolate the Huks from the population.  The Huks viewed the 
Catholic Church as competition for supporters throughout Huklandia.  They “sought 
followers among the same masses who were the church-goers, so the confrontations were 
frequently savage.”173  The Huks began to systemically target the clergy, which resulted 
in the military offering its assistance to protect the churches.  This developed into a 
broader partnership with not only the Catholic Church, but numerous Christian 
denominations, to include the evangelical Iglesiani Kristo (a Protestant offshoot with 
wide support in the Philippines).  American evangelical missionaries developed radio 
stations that broadcast sermons throughout Luzon.  Radio sets were distributed to willing 
listeners who would gather groups together for prayer in the barrios throughout the 
countryside.174  Magsaysay “…discovered that they had a daily audience of thousands, 
sorted throughout the danger-laden areas of Luzon where the Huks were operating—
including some barrios which government officials didn’t dare visit.”175  Magsaysay co-
opted this network to clarify the ethics behind government action, and talked directly to 
the people to ask for their understanding.176  By linking in to the churches’ pre-
established communications network, Magsaysay effectively maximized his ability to 
project the government’s message. 
Appropriate funding and economic reform were needed to solidify gains in the 
contested areas.  Magsaysay was able to elicit the support of Vice-President Fernando 
Lopez, who ran a peace fund campaign toward the end of 1950, to help with Magsaysay’s 
reform efforts.  Filipino citizens donated two million pesos ($1 million US) that went into 
the EDCOR program.177  Next, Magsaysay targeted agrarian lending reform.  He had 
strong feelings about the existing system and felt that a liberalization of rural credit was 
needed.  Through COL Lansdale and JUSMAG, Magsaysay met with the Chinese 
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community to ask for its assistance.  A deal was negotiated whereby the Chinese would 
provide credit to the rural areas in contested areas in return for the government’s 
assistance in eliminating the racketeering that was destroying their businesses.178  Thus, 
Magsaysay was able to indirectly assure the tenant farmers of Huklandia they would 
receive credit while simultaneously fighting corruption and eliminating racketeering back 
in Manila.  This represented a short-term fix as Magsaysay, working through Congress, 
labored to redesign a more permanent solution. 
5. Cognitive Liberation 
The perception of the government changed for the better in the eyes of the 
Filipino population as a result of the cumulative effect of Magsaysay’s efforts against the 
Huks.  Magsaysay solidified this support by establishing a telegraph system whereby 
Filipinos could send a message directly to his headquarters.  He wanted “the people to 
write him about both good and bad things they saw troops doing, as well as anything they 
wanted to tell him about the Huks.”179  This flattened line of communication helped 
achieve numerous operational successes, which in turn fostered the belief that the 
government was going to win.  The message was that, together, the government and the 
people were going to defeat corruption, eliminate the Huk threat, and right the social 
injustices that existed in the Philippines.  By promoting a better future for the nation and 
exhibiting leadership, Magsaysay became a symbol of good governance and was 
showered with political support since, as Valeriano and Bohannon note, “…actions 
undertaken to build support for the government will almost inevitably build political 
support for the leader who, by his words and actions, exemplifies the intentions of 
government and the aspirations of the governed.”180  Not only was Magsaysay able to 
project his vision, frame issues to align multiple groups towards achieving his vision, and  
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develop a realistic strategic narrative that the military and population both bought into, 
but he used his popularity to win the Presidential election of 1953 and end the Huk 
Rebellion. 
6. Leadership Team 
Ramon Magsaysay, with advice from COL Lansdale, developed a leadership team 
that allowed him to maintain influence across information operations, politics, and in the 
operational fight against the Huks.  The composition and trust he had in his leadership 
team allowed Magsaysay to sustain effort along multiple lines of operation.  COL 
Lansdale acted as an unofficial chief of staff and provided oversight for Magsaysay.  
The EDCOR was created by COL Ciriaco Mirasol as a means to provide 
rehabilitation to Huk fighters.  COL Mirasol was appointed the head of the program and 
subsequently ran development efforts for Magsaysay.181  Magsaysay quickly gained the 
support of Manuel “Dindo” Gonzales following Magsaysay’s nomination as Secretary of 
National Defense.  Dindo Gonzales, who led the Philippine Information Council, proved 
influential in linking Magsaysay with local clubs and the local and foreign press.182  
Gonzales’s council acted as a conduit for Magsaysay’s information operations and 
provided widespread distribution of Magsaysay’s messages.  Gonzales was directly 
responsible for linking Magsaysay with Edgar Elbert, the President of the Lions 
International.  Elbert viewed Magsaysay’s efforts as significant and added credibility to 
Magsaysay in the international fight against communism in Asia; Elbert also connected 
Magsaysay to the Lions Clubs from Nevada and California, which provided farming 
implements, clothes, and items for Magsaysay to distribute.183  Major Jose Crisol was 
known for possessing an uncanny understanding of psychological operations and was 
thus appointed the Under-Secretary of National Defense.  He was particularly influential 
creating the appearance of legitimacy for elections.184   
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Magsaysay’s ability to generate political support among the Filipino Congress and 
Senate was also important.  Emmanuel Pelaez, a liberal congressman, aided Magsaysay 
by acting as the mouthpiece to connect Magsaysay to sympathetic politicians.  Through 
Pelaez, Senator Lorenzo Tanada (Citizen’s Party Leader), Claudio Teehankee, Jose P. 
Laurel (Nationalist Party) and Claro M. Recto (Nationalist Party) generated political 
opportunities for Magsaysay.  Laurel and Recto were persuasive in getting Magsaysay to 
switch political parties from the Liberal Party to the Nationalist Party, which eventually 
led to Magsaysay’s election as President of the Philippines in 1953.185 
Lastly, Magsaysay was able to recruit Huk commanders to the government’s side 
in order to promote rehabilitation to the Huks.  Two key previous commanders were 
Commander Gipana and Nava.  Both commanders were important leaders within the Huk 
rebellion who, once they were turned, became rabid supporters of Magsaysay.186  It was 
through defectors such as these two commanders that Magsaysay was able to 
systematically dismantle support for the Huk Rebellion. 
7. Traits of a Leader 
Magsaysay proved that he was not only able to manipulate the political process to 
consolidate and control a social movement, but he also possessed the key elements 
necessary to be a good leader.    Magsaysay made use of all three forms of authority 
described by Weber –traditional, legal/ rational, and charismatic –187utilizing each when 
appropriate to promote his vision.  His authority enabled him to manipulate his 
environment and bypass bottlenecks by having supporters help him achieve his desired 
end-state. 
Magsaysay was viewed as a “people’s” politician.  His modest upbringing in 
Zambales, differentiated him from members of the political aristocracy in the capital 
whose status signaled they were corrupt.  He was empathetic to the struggles of the poor 
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in Central Luzon after having lived among them for so long.  He understood the peasants 
and they understood him.  He believed, “communism could not be eradicated so long as 
millions owned no land, but were merely peons tied to the master’s soil.”188  Perhaps the 
fact that Filipinos lack the strong tribal ties that are present in so many other countries 
helps explain how Magsaysay was able to resonate with so many people.  He was 
considered trustworthy and his crusade to combat corruption proved he was on the 
people’s side. 
Magsaysay possessed unprecedented legal authority during both his time as the 
Secretary of National Defense and later as President of the Philippines.  As previously 
mentioned, he had the power to reorganize both the military and the constabulary.  
Thanks to his legal authority, he had the political capital to modify economic conditions, 
start community programs like EDCOR, and end rampant graft in rural areas.  The fact 
that he was a high-ranking government official surely assisted in his winning public 
support away from the Huks.  In short, Magsaysay used this institutional authority to 
change the system by using the system, while at the same time developing processes that 
would solidify the changes he introduced over the long-term. 
Finally, Magsaysay’s charismatic authority granted him the political space in 
which to operate.  Magsaysay was viewed as a charismatic leader by the officers of 
JUSMAG PHL who were responsible for assisting with the campaign against the Huks.  
JUSMAG PHL advocated both for his appointment as Secretary of National Defense and 
that he be given far reaching power over the military.  More importantly, Magsaysay’s 
charismatic authority ensured that he resonated with the military and with the population.  
He smartly played on his appeal to achieve tactical and operational successes in order to 
further consolidate broad approval.  In sum, he utilized his charisma and combined it with 
his legal authority and traditional standing to advance his vision and defeat the Huks. 
E. TAKEAWAYS 
It is difficult to identify a leader’s potential.  However, Magsaysay’s example 
highlights some factors that were key to his being successful.  Among them: Magsaysay 
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identified the socioeconomic issues that were stimulating the rebellion and enabling it to 
thrive.  He reoriented the military’s efforts to address these grievances and usurp the 
Huks’ main issue.  In addition, he was able to take advantage of political opportunities 
and shape perceptions to complement his vision.  He also proved able to build his 
network by allying with groups that had complementary goals to his own.  Furthermore, 
he found means to identify latent networks and used established organizations, rather 
than individuals, to gain support for his vision, which resulted in their rapid shift to the 
government’s side.  Lastly, Magsaysay was very successful at providing people with 
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V. THE UGLY: HAMID KARZAI  
A. INTRODUCTION  
So far, examples of the “Good” (Magsaysay) and “Bad” (Chalabi) have given us 
several things to consider in terms of identifying, vetting, and working with indigenous 
leaders in order to create and lead a successful movement.  This chapter presents a far 
messier and less straight-forward case.  Hamid Karzai’s case in Afghanistan highlights 
that sometimes an individual may be “Mr. Right” initially, but when conditions change 
and opportunities are squandered, an individual’s shelf-life as the right indigenous leader 
may expire.  Also, this case suggests that sometimes conditions may exist that prevent 
anyone from succeeding in uniting disparate groups in such a broken country as 
Afghanistan.   
Here we examine the leadership value and partnership potential that Karzai 
possessed during his initial selection in 2001.  We then compare his initial feasibility as a 
leader to his viability as an institutional/political leader during later stages of the U.S.’s 
partnership with him. 
To be clear, this case study will show that Karzai was initially the correct choice 
in 2001 to lead Afghanistan towards a new future.  He was imbued with traditional 
authority and later developed a level of charismatic following, along with being assigned 
legal authority upon becoming president.  However, as time progressed, and without 
meaningful improvements to Afghanistan’s political stability, the indigenous population 
and Karzai’s international partners lost faith in his government’s ability to provide a 
stable transition and consolidate opportunities presented by the Taliban’s initial defeat.  
Karzai’s value as a partner varied over time and therefore his case exemplifies the need to 
continually reevaluate indigenous leaders in order to assess the utility of continuing the 
partnership.   
We examine what changed with Karzai and the environment that transformed his 
value from one of high potential for partnership to a much murkier relationship.  Was it 
the change in conditions from his serving as a “resistance” leader to the more formal 
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setting of state leader that altered his value?  Did Karzai ever have viability as a long-
term partner?  Perhaps what is required in statesmen calls for different attributes and 
effort than those found in initial movement leaders.  Or, is it simply that the strategic end-
states of the U.S. and Karzai’s vision of Afghanistan’s future became unaligned?  These 
questions will be addressed in this chapter in order refine the leadership heuristic 
presented in the final chapter. 
B. BACKGROUND—WHO IS HAMID KARZAI? 
Hamid Karzai is currently the tribal chief (or khan) of the Pashtun Popalzai tribe 
(of roughly 500,000 individuals), centered in Kandahar, which is one of the major sub-
tribes of the Durrani Tribal Confederation.  His family has historical prominence in 
Afghanistan and his lineage has long led the Popalzai tribe.  Karzai replaced his father, 
Abdul Ahad Karzai, as the head of the tribe after Abdul Ahad’s assassination in 1999 in 
Quetta, Pakistan, likely by the Afghan Taliban.189  Karzai spent his childhood between 
his home province of Kandahar, where he was born in 1957, and the country’s capital of 
Kabul, because his father, in addition to being a prominent tribal chief, was also a 
member of the Afghan Parliament during the period when King Zahir Shah led a 
constitutional monarchy.190 
Karzai’s upbringing allowed him to observe the two sides of Afghan politics.  
First, Karzai witnessed the deeply tribal society and traditions that existed outside of 
metropolitan areas in Afghanistan.  He often traveled with his father around southern 
Afghanistan, as his father settled disputes based on his authority as a tribal chief.191  
Second, based on his time spent in Kabul witnessing his father’s relationship with the 
king and national government, and given his education and interactions with the 
mujahedeen, Karzai carried with him a deeply nationalistic view of Afghanistan.192  
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From these experiences, Karzai early on understood the power of traditional authority, as 
well as the reaches of legal authority in Afghanistan.  An important point to emphasize 
here is that even during the golden years of democracy in Afghanistan under King Zahir 
Shah, more political power resided at the local khan level than in the legal authority 
vested in elected officials.193 
When Karzai was 14 years old, the king’s cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, 
conducted a coup supported by the Soviet Union.194  This event initiated Afghanistan’s 
descent into chaos.  This coup was eventually followed by two successive coups, all led 
by communist leaning individuals, and finally by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979, and the Soviet’s emplacement of Babrak Karmel and then Mohammad 
Najibullah (in 1987) as presidents.  Two of the coup leaders, Nur Muhammed Taraki and 
Hafizullah Amin, began to degrade Afghan traditions and normative culture through their 
especially heavy-handed and brutal methods of governance.195  Taraki detained large 
numbers of political prisoners. Karzai’s father was one of them.   
While his father was imprisoned, Karzai pursued his undergraduate and graduate 
level education in India. He majored in International Affairs and Political Science.196  
When Babrak Karmal came to power, Karzai’s father was released from prison and began 
working with his friend, Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, in Mojaddedi’s Soviet 
resistance group. The group was the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF) based in 
Quetta, Pakistan, one of the few moderate and nationalist mujahedeen groups.197   
Upon completing college, Karzai joined his father and worked for the ANLF as an 
operations organizer and interlocutor between it and other mujahedeen groups and with 
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international organizations and governments.198  His lineage, education, linguistic ability 
(he speaks several languages), ability to relate to people, and his charismatic disposition 
made him an invaluable asset to the ANLF.199  Though Karzai was never recognized for 
his prowess as a warrior, he did participate in combat on a small scale in order to achieve 
credibility as a mujahid.200  
Upon the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, several 
hundred Afghan tribal and opposition leaders met in Islamabad, Pakistan and established 
a government-in-exile, which eventually took over following the surrender of 
Mohammad Najibullah’s government in 1992.201  Karzai was subsequently appointed to 
be the deputy Foreign Minister.202  He only held this position for two years before 
resigning and leaving Afghanistan for Quetta due to growing instability and infighting in 
Afghanistan. 
Stability in Afghanistan was short lived, as the mujahedeen groups led by Ahmed 
Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyr began to fight for control of Kabul.203  Intense 
infighting ensued within the interim government, which further prevented progress 
towards good governance and stability.  The instability caused by this fighting paved the 
way for the Taliban to eventually take control of Afghanistan in 1996.   
C. THE SITUATION FROM THE FALL OF THE MUJAHEDEEN 
GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT 
1. Karzai During the Taliban Years 
Karzai initially aligned himself with the Taliban, but soon found their policies  
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untenable and overly influenced by extremists.204  The Taliban courted Karzai to 
participate in its government as their ambassador to the United Nations, but he 
declined.205 
Karzai spent the years that the Taliban were in control (1996-2001) in Pakistan, 
where he emerged as one of their primary Pashtun opponents.  His efforts were almost 
exclusively diplomatic and political. He called for international assistance to topple the 
Taliban regime and for a Loya Jirga to be held to organize a new government.  This 
included organizing and attending several anti-Taliban dialogues in Islamabad, Istanbul, 
and Frankfurt.206  He also conducted propaganda efforts, including a leaflet drive in 
Kandahar, and participated in radio interviews that were broadcast into Afghanistan by 
international media.207 
Karzai was recognized by the non-Taliban aligned Pashtun population in 
Afghanistan as a prominent and visible opposition leader.208  However, unlike other 
opponents of the Taliban regime, such as the Northern Alliance, an amalgam of ethnic 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras led by Ahmad Shah Masoud, Karzai and the Pashtun 
opposition did not have a large militia with which to confront the Taliban. The absence of 
a cohesive Pashtun fighting force would eventually have an impact on the fight from the 
south in 2001; it also affected Karzai’s ability to project power to maintain law and order 
against the various warlords once he was appointed as the leader of Afghanistan.  Even 
without the existence of a large resistance network inside Afghanistan, Karzai decided to 
launch an insurgency effort in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., 
likely anticipating U.S. and international involvement in his country.    
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2. The Fall of the Taliban 
Karzai’s march to fame as a resistance leader began in mid-October 2001 when he 
and three followers entered Afghanistan on motorcycles.209  While Karzai had minimal 
experience in warfare and virtually no supplies with which to conduct operations against 
the Taliban, he relied on his position as a khan and opposition leader to mobilize the 
populace. He first went to Kandahar province, before moving north to Uruzgan province.  
Karzai met with tribal leaders and achieved only limited overt military support from the 
population, as they remained dormant waiting to see how events would unfold.  However, 
the population did provide intelligence and early warning regarding the Taliban’s force 
movements, and Karzai was able to gain moral support and a small following of 150 or 
so militants.210 
During this initial period, Karzai maneuvered to avoid a direct confrontation with 
the Taliban while rallying the population and calling for a Loya Jirga.  He was eventually 
airlifted from Uruzgan to Pakistan by the U.S. military in order to avoid being overrun by 
Taliban forces.211  Abdul Haq, another prominent anti-Taliban Pashtun and viable leader, 
likewise tried to do what Karzai did in mid-October, but was immediately caught and 
executed by the Taliban.212  Haq’s death left Karzai as the principal Pashtun leader with 
whom the U.S. had to work.     
Subsequently, Karzai was able to engage the Taliban with the aid of the U.S. 
military in the form of Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (or ODA) 574 from 
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and U.S. air support.  Karzai identified Tarin Kowt, 
the capital of Uruzgan province, as a key target, describing it as the Taliban heartland.  
He maintained that taking it would cause a large portion of the population to break with 
                                                 
209 Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New 
Afghanistan (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 71.  
210 Mills, Karzai, 159. 
211 James Dobbins, After the Taliban, Potomac Books (Washington D.C.: 2008), 30. 
212 “Interview: Captain Jason Amerine,” Public Broadcast Station (PBS) Frontline, July 9 and 12, 
2002, accessed September 3, 2013, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/amerine.html.  
 61 
the Taliban.213  Prior to his arrival on November 16, Karzai received word that the 
population of Tarin Kowt had toppled local Taliban forces there.214   Karzai soon learned 
that the Taliban were sending forces from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt.215  It was evident 
from the flow of information that Karzai had an extensive information network and 
connections throughout the Pashtun Tribal Belt.216  This aided him in gathering 
intelligence and updating key local leaders, which helped him instigate resistance and 
eventually led to the defeat of the Taliban. 
On November 18, Karzai’s 800-man force with ODA 574 and U.S. air support 
engaged a force of approximately 1,000 Taliban fighters near Tarin Kowt.  Karzai’s 
forces managed to force a retreat of the Taliban back to Kandahar.217  News of this 
victory spread, with Karzai named as the victor, which lent him credibility as a guerrilla 
leader.218 
As Karzai and his forces moved on Kandahar, they met minimal resistance thanks 
to the population rising up against the Taliban.219  Eventually, in early December, a 
Taliban envoy sent by Mullah Omar officially surrendered to Karzai.  During this 
southern campaign, Karzai gained credibility as the military and political leader 
responsible for the uprising against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.220  One early 
observation by ODA 574’s commander was that Karzai had not named a second-in-
command in order to prevent any infighting or tribal pandering that might have resulted 
from an appointment.221  This decision was indicative of the complicated relationships 
and rivalries that came to the fore during the political phase of Karzai’s operations. 
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3. Karzai and the Presidency  
During the initial phase of combat in Afghanistan, members of the U.S. 
government were conducting meetings with members of the Afghan opposition and 
several representatives of interested governments (such as Pakistan and Iran, among 
others).  One of the key players in this effort was James Dobbins, who served as the lead 
U.S. diplomat at the Bonn Conference in 2001.  According to Dobbins, Hamid Karzai 
was identified by most of these factions and the governments of Iran and Pakistan as a 
leader capable of running a transitional government.222  Many viewed Karzai as a safe 
choice (or compromise candidate), one of a very small number of Pashtun leaders not 
associated with the Taliban who were acceptable to most parties.  In addition, Karzai was 
a nationalist who had continually advocated for a non-ethnicity based Afghan 
government.  He was also not closely associated with the Northern Alliance, which eased 
Pakistan’s concerns about the post-Taliban era.   
According to Dobbins, the U.S. was leaning towards finding a credible Pashtun to 
lead a new Afghanistan. Selection priorities included having no association with the 
Taliban and being palatable to other opposition groups, chiefly the Northern Alliance.223  
This was based on the need to placate the Pashtun tribes, which made up 60 percent of 
Afghanistan’s population.224  Karzai also broadly appealed to members of the U.S. 
government.  General Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), stated that upon meeting Karzai prior to military operations in southern 
Afghanistan, he found Karzai to be the “…right Pashtun leader to build that [a Pashtun 
opposition] force.”225  The CIA, who had worked with Karzai during the 1980s and 
1990s, also supported him as a future national leader.226 
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Karzai was inaugurated as the head of the interim Afghan government on 
December 22, 2001, under the Bonn Agreement.  Unlike Chalabi, who continued to wear 
western-style suits during his engagements in Iraq, Karzai, during his inauguration and 
beyond, wore an outfit that represented a blend of Pashtun, Tajik, and Uzbek traditional 
dress, physically symbolizing a unified Afghanistan.227  Also, he showed an adept 
understanding of his environment when he decided to enter Kabul alone once the Taliban 
surrendered.  This was a symbolic act designed to avoid conflict between militia factions 
and it emphasized Karzai’s approach to nationalism. 228 
During his early years in office, Karzai maintained broad support internally and 
abroad.  During the country’s first post-Soviet democratic election in 2004, Karzai won 
55.4 percent of the votes, with a voter turnout of 80 percent.229  He also ushered in a new 
permanent government consisting of a presidential-system with a parliament comprised 
of an upper and lower house.  This occurred through Loya Jirgas held in 2002 and 2004 
to solidify a constitution and pave the way to national elections in 2005.230   
4. Afghanistan and Complications with a Central Government 
However, several problems emerged for the Karzai government, which were 
exacerbated by the nature of U.S. activities, commitment and assistance.  These problems 
were a detriment to the U.S.-Karzai relationship.  They included the existence of a 
security vacuum upon the fall of the Taliban, the history of Afghanistan prior to U.S. 
involvement (including the track record of central governments), the presence of warlords 
and the threat of fiefdoms developing, Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, and rampant 
corruption throughout the new government.     
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Ryan Crocker, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, has commented that 
Karzai has the most difficult and dangerous job in the world.231  Since taking office, 
Karzai has had to struggle to project his government’s authority outside of Kabul.  The 
monstrous task of establishing a strong central government has culminated in mixed 
results and damaged relationships.  Dobbins points out that the U.S. government initially 
desired to keep its involvement in Afghanistan minimal.  Dobbins and Zalmay Khalilzad 
(then-National Security Advisor to President Bush) disagreed with the U.S. government’s 
insistence on setting geographic limits on ISAF forces (which relegated them to Kabul).  
According to Khalilzad, the idea that Afghans could provide local security throughout the 
country was irresponsible and naïve.232  From the start, Karzai wanted international 
forces to deploy throughout the country to secure major population centers and project 
broader security.233  Other leaders, such as Muhammad Qasim Fahim and Abdul Rashid 
Dostom, also urged a more robust international security presence around the country.234   
The U.S. initially pledged only a little over five percent of the total aid provided 
to Afghanistan in the first year after the fall of the Taliban.235  The U.S. did not want to 
get heavily involved or drawn into nation-building in Afghanistan.  As an example, in 
2003, U.S. aid was $500 million (versus $18 billion aid authorized by Congress for Iraq 
in 2003).236  These early commitments (or lack thereof) were also early harbingers of the 
quagmire and lack of good governance to come.    
The U.S. did step up its aid (to $2.2 billion) and its security effort in 2004, but by 
that time, two years where visible changes could have been observed by the population 
had been squandered.237  Since then, between 2002 and 2013, the U.S. has provided $100 
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billion in non-military aid to Afghanistan, with an additional $51 billion going to build 
and train the Afghan military.238  There is little, however, to show for such an 
investment.  Though lack of U.S. oversight of spending is partly to blame, corruption 
became so rampant that the Karzai government began to fall from U.S. favor in recent 
years.   
The U.S.’s relationship with and assistance to warlords, in their quest to hunt 
down remnants of al Qaeda and stem a growing insurgency, also weakened the central 
government’s control.239  The U.S.’s relationship with these warlords solidified their 
autonomy early on.  The population recognized the problems warlords pose; during a 
poll, many respondents indicated that local warlords brought insecurity to their 
district.240 
Karzai’s efforts to marginalize powerbrokers, by offering them positions in the 
Kabul government and away from their constituencies (such as with Ismail Khan in the 
west, Rashid Dostom in the north, and Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh in the south), has 
done little to achieve centrally-controlled governance in those areas.  A point to consider 
though is that efforts by past Afghan governments to push central authority too quickly to 
the Afghan hinterlands without buy-in from local powerbrokers led to their collapse 
(King Amanullah Khan in the 1920s and the regimes of the 1980s and 1990s).241  
Though many disparage Karzai’s government, it has prevented the outbreak of a civil war 
similar to what occurred after the mujahedeen government took control in 1992.  
Douglas Ollivant, an advisor to General David Petraeus (when Petraeus was top 
U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan) has written that the district level was the 
decisive point for the U.S. effort, since it is where Karzai-appointed governors interact 
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with a traditional council of elders.242  However, the American effort to create a synergy 
between the local and national levels failed. 
The Taliban finding sanctuary in Pakistan is another factor that has hurt the 
central government’s ability to govern.  Karzai repeatedly warned the U.S. and the 
international community that the Taliban’s ability to maintain sanctuaries in Pakistan 
would have negative effects.243  However, the U.S. has done little to address the 
symbiotic relationship between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan, or to degrade the safe 
havens the Taliban enjoys in Pakistan.  Karzai pointed out in 2010 that, along with 
damaging his ability to project good governance, the U.S.’s ineffectiveness in reining in 
the ISI and their relationship with the Taliban has forced Karzai to “…deepen his 
relationship with Pakistan if he wants peace talks with the Taliban.”244  Also, corruption 
and incompetence in the police force and judiciary, along with corrupt and inept 
administrators at the district level, have inherently weakened Kabul’s capacity to govern, 
and have left room for the Taliban to fill the void.245 
In 2009, Transparency International listed Afghanistan as second only to Somalia 
for public-sector corruption.246  General David Petraeus remarked to President Obama 
that elements of Karzai’s government were better viewed as crime syndicates.247  The 
U.S. has continually engaged the Karzai government on anti-corruption, which led to a 
2011 effort by the Afghan government to focus on low-level corruption (not high-level 
corruption).248  In 2011, Petraeus listed anti-corruption as a top priority of his counter-
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insurgency strategy.249  Karzai has verbally supported anti-corruption efforts to 
international donors, but none of these initiatives have been enacted as laws.250  Also, 
Karzai has often balked at confronting corrupt power brokers, likely due to his inability 
to effectively diminish their influence and power base, as well as to retain their general 
support.  As an example of how Karzai has refused to seriously tackle corruption, in 
2010, he fired a senior prosecutor for investigating corruption of senior members of the 
government, including 17 members of his cabinet.251  Also, though some government 
officials have been removed from their positions, there has never been a high profile 
individual criminally prosecuted and charged for corruption.252 
5. Karzai and the Souring Relationship with the U.S. 
With President Obama’s military “surge” in 2009 and the end of large-scale U.S. 
involvement in Iraq, aid and military support to Afghanistan has drastically increased.  
The surge was considered necessary in order to stabilize Afghan enough to hand over 
security to Afghan security forces and set conditions for a speedier withdrawal of the 
majority of U.S. combat forces.253  Rajiv Chandrasekaran claims that Karzai never 
agreed with U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, but viewed infiltration from Pakistani as 
Afghanistan’s most pressing security problem.254  Though Karzai did not publicly 
denounce the idea of a U.S. military surge, many of his close associates expressed the 
view that a “surge” was the wrong strategy.  Several tribal leaders, as well as some of 
Karzai’s aides stated, in effect, that more foreign military forces would bring more 
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bloodshed, and that creating jobs and using local leaders to negotiate would produce 
better results.255  Thus, in 2011, it was not hard for Karzai to publicly express his 
pleasure at the withdrawal of “surge” troops, pointing that Afghans needed to take 
responsibility for security and highlighting his frustration with the way U.S. forces were 
conducting counterinsurgency.256    
Prior to the surge, there were only 38,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan; with the 
surge, an additional 21,000 deployed, with 4,000 earmarked to train and advise.257  
However, the Obama administration had little hope of creating a “perfect” Afghan state, 
as evidenced by its announcement (in 2011) of a 2014 withdrawal of major U.S. forces 
and a transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government.   
Illustrating the Obama administration’s lack of confidence in Karzai, a State 
Department cable from 2009 reported that Vice President Biden (among others in the 
U.S. administration) was skeptical of the prospects of a legitimate central government in 
Afghanistan.  The cable noted that in several areas local officials had no idea how to 
govern, and there was no realistic hope of strong rule of law under a centralized, Karzai-
led government.258 
Since at least 2007, Karzai’s relationship with the U.S. has been spiraling 
downward. This is when Karzai began to publicly, and emotionally, berate ISAF for its 
excessive use of airpower, which was causing civilian casualties.259  He has since 
accused foreigners of “‘pursuing their own interests’ while claiming to want to help 
Afghans, adding that ‘a very thin curtain distinguishes between cooperation and 
assistance with the invasion.’”260 
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In the run-up to the 2009 Afghan presidential election, the U.S. did not endorse 
Karzai (as it had done in 2004), which created paranoia that the U.S. was against him.261  
This paranoia was not completely misplaced.  In a 2009 (leaked) cable, then-Afghanistan 
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry remarked that “…any American president who puts the 
success of his strategy in Karzai’s hands ought to have his head examined…[Karzai] is 
not an adequate strategic partner…[and] continues to shun responsibility for any 
sovereign burden.”262  He further reported on, “…Karzai’s fundamental incompetence, 
citing his ‘inability to grasp the most rudimentary principles of state-building.’”263 
But, Karzai’s relationship with the U.S. really began to publicly sour in 2011, 
with his comment that if war broke out between Pakistan and the U.S., Afghanistan 
would side with Pakistan.  Since then, he has made numerous public statements debasing 
the U.S. as an unreliable and inconsistent partner.  The most recent example involves the 
U.S.’s handling of negotiations with the Taliban reconciliation process.  All the while, 
though, Karzai has urged more U.S. commitments to Afghanistan militarily and 
monetarily.264  Karzai appears acutely aware of his country’s vulnerabilities and the 
geopolitical forces operating in the region, and he appears to be taking a realist approach 
to the situation.  He recognizes that Afghanistan needs continued international help to 
move the state towards a safe and stable environment.265  But Karzai has also begun to 
look towards “political alternatives” to NATO, to include depending on regional 
countries such as Iran and Pakistan for support.266 
Karzai has continually expressed frustration with the way that the U.S. has 
prosecuted its counterinsurgency in Afghanistan by relying too heavily on body-counts 
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and empowering local militias (such as through the establishment of Afghan Local Police 
(or ALP)), which Karzai believes alienate the population.267  However, despite Karzai’s 
deep concerns about the ALP spiraling out of control and creating unruly militias, in 
2010 he authorized its implementation after extensive discussions and urging by General 
Petraeus.268 
In 2011, Karzai called for an end to U.S. night raids, and recently (March 2013) 
he has gone so far as to order the withdrawal of U.S. Special Operations forces from 
Wardak province, accusing U.S. forces and/or their local partners (ALP) of conducting 
war crimes (the order has since been rescinded).269  Petraeus, like General Stanley 
McChrystal before him, understood the negative effects that civilian casualties were 
having on counterinsurgency efforts and the U.S. relationship with the Karzai 
government overall (as it received increasing domestic pressure over civilian casualties), 
and in 2011, Petraeus stated,  “…if there was too much fog and friction, ISAF troops 
should pull back, not press on.”270 
Other tensions have arisen over settlement talks with the Taliban.  Karzai has 
expressed frustration with the U.S. for meeting independently with Taliban envoys in 
2013 to pursue independent peace talks.  He recently stressed that the Afghan 
government will not conduct talks with the Taliban until representatives from the group 
contact the Afghan government directly, stating that the peace-process must be Afghan-
led.271  In the aftermath of Karzai’s recent remarks, President Obama publicly announced 
the potential for a total U.S. withdrawal forces in 2014;272 he likely did so in order to 
pressure Karzai to step back from his rhetoric. 
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The situation looks bleak for Afghanistan. The government has not created 
revenue streams apart from international aid.  As reported by the International Crisis 
Group in 2011, Karzai’s government is “…hopelessly corrupt, ineffectual, and close to 
collapse,” and the report concludes, “Failure in Afghanistan is not inevitable, but without 
a recalibration of the current counterinsurgency strategy, success is far from 
guaranteed.”273 
D. VETTING FOR THE RIGHT MOVEMENT LEADER AND KARZAI’S 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Karzai was one of only a few Pashtun leaders to choose from during 2001.  His 
personal attributes and the structural conditions that existed made him an ideal candidate, 
at least initially.  He had support from a broad set of interested parties.  Also, his 
nationalistic leanings made him a low-threat option given the disparate indigenous groups 
and the international community writ large.   
In the following, we discuss Karzai’s suitability for the roles he held, both as 
resistance leader (circa 2001) and then as president (circa 2013). 
1. Authority and Leadership Capital 
Karzai always represented some level of authority.  First, based on his familial 
role as khan of the Popalzai tribe, Karzai held a substantial degree of traditional authority 
over a large portion of the Pashtun population in southern Afghanistan.  Based on this 
role, he also received respect from other tribal leaders and powerbrokers.  However, the 
disparate and combative nature of Afghanistan society meant that Karzai’s level of 
traditional authority did not always induce compliance and support from all sectors.  By 
the time he was “selected” by the U.S. as its man, Karzai had a high level of traditional 
authority, and a marginal (but growing) level of charismatic authority, but little legal 
authority.  Karzai did gain additional charismatic authority during his time as the leader 
of the uprising against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan in 2001.   
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After the Taliban’s defeat, Karzai’s charismatic authority helped him be selected 
and then elected as president.   This position granted him legal authority.  However, the 
level of electoral authority afforded to national leaders in Afghanistan is much lower than 
that found in western countries.  Karzai’s legal authority did not secure him the level of 
leadership resources required to achieve security and governance throughout 
Afghanistan.  Instead, he had to rely more on historic and traditional sources of Afghan 
national power that depend heavily on conciliations/pandering to local powerbrokers.  As 
Nick Mills points out, tradition rules the countryside.274  Even so, we can say that upon 
becoming president Karzai had at least moderate levels of all three types of authority.   
However, with his 2005 election victory, Karzai gradually began to lose the 
charismatic authority he had earned, and the level of perceived authority that government 
officials had (legal authority) began to diminish.  This was largely due to the 
government’s inability to provide essential services, rule of law, or mechanisms to curb 
rampant corruption.  Karzai still maintained his traditional authority and some degree of 
legal authority (or at least he had more than anyone else), but the central government 
failed to wrest authority and control away from the warlords who had slowly amassed 
their own authority over decades. 
Mills points to the Afghan tradition of Buzkashi (or “goat grabbing”)275 to 
illustrate how Afghan leaders view and use authority and leadership capital, in what he 
refers to as the “Buzkashi mentality.”276  This mentality is useful to illustrate the Afghan 
governance process and specifically how Karzai operates.277  Karzai understands the  
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limits of his legal and traditional authority and is hesitant to overextend his capabilities 
beyond what he knows he can accomplish, specifically in terms of his dealings with 
warlords and other powerbrokers.278   
As far as Karzai’s personal attributes, he has always displayed confidence shaped 
by his ability to synthesize information and effectively communicate both locally and to 
an international audience.  His education and experiences as a khan and mujahedeen 
leader (especially as a liaison to local and international players) provided him with a solid 
relational foundation as a resistance leader.  His previous positions also made him ideal 
for tying together the disparate indigenous groups.  Initially, everyone seemed to respect 
Karzai and sublimate their own ambitions for national power.  
In terms of leadership capital, Karzai had a deep level of cultural capital.  
Initially, his social and symbolic capital were equally substantial.  As a resistance leader, 
he was able to bridge the gap between activist and non-activist groups, local and 
international authorities, and achieve a level of mutual appreciation and understanding 
among the various factions.  His cultural understanding (across Afghans ethnicities) and 
his narrative about nationalism greatly enhanced his appeal.  Karzai’s influence remained 
mostly intact during the first few years of his presidency.  However, his social and 
symbolic capital has decreased significantly in recent years.  Having once represented the 
potential future of Afghanistan, touting nationalism and security, Karzai’s regime has 
since come to represent government dysfunction to both Afghans and others.   
2. The Environment: Expanding (and Then Shrinking) Political 
Opportunities 
Afghanistan in 2001 was rife with system strain, primarily due to the repressive 
Taliban regime, poor economic conditions and lack of basic government services.  The 
population was tired after 20-plus years of fighting, and yearned for liberation from the 
Taliban, as well as for social and political instability.  Karzai was able to exploit this 
strain, assisted by U.S. military aid, sufficient to create a tipping point in the population. 
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Richard Ponzio summarizes the challenges that confronted Karzai: “…postwar 
democratization efforts are fraught with challenges and, when poorly managed, can lead 
to instability and violence…why then did the international community…pursue a high-
risk democratic peace-building strategy with a ‘light footprint’ [in Afghanistan]…?”279  
The U.S.’s (and international community’s) under-emphasis on capacity building and 
providing security allowed warlords and eventually the Taliban to fill the governance and 
security void that a weak national government created.  This was exacerbated by 
rudimentary infrastructure, the absence of a national military or professional police force, 
and a shortage of educated and experienced Afghan administrators and technocrats, 
which was a byproduct of 20-plus years of civil strife.280 
Afghan history militates against Karzai developing strong central control and 
authority.  In fact, a national survey in 2005 found that religious scholars, warlords, tribal 
elders, and then elected officials (in that order) were listed as those who command 
“…power and the capability to influence the behavior of Afghans.”281  As Ponzio notes, 
often Afghans’ concept of authority puts them at odds with external actors, as Afghans 
see authority imbued in “…traditional rules, dominant individuals, and personal 
relationships….”282  To exercise a level of legitimacy and maintain central government 
control outside of Kabul, Karzai found himself having to make concessions to warlords 
and local powerbrokers.  This has devolved into Karzai having to rely on traditional deal-
making and pandering to local powerbrokers to solidify support for “central” control.  In 
turn that means Karzai has had to turn a blind eye to corruption and powerbrokers’ 
involvement in narco-related activities.283 
Karzai’s understanding of Afghanistan’s dynamic environment, and his ability to 
navigate through it, is certainly impressive, but it has not set well with the U.S. or the 
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ISAF coalition.  Put differently, since the population has failed to move away from local 
powerbrokers towards the central government, several fiefdoms exist across the country, 
and the central government lacks the capacity or capability to confront the country’s most 
daunting problems.284 
3. The Network: Indigenous Organizational Strength 
Failing to build and maintain cohesive national governance is one of Karzai’s 
biggest failings.  Though he had (and still has) a strong information network and Pashtun 
tribal network in the south to rely on, Karzai proved unable to bring together the 
opposition to overthrow the Taliban prior to U.S. and international intervention in 2001.  
Karzai did succeed in putting together agreements with powerbrokers in traditional 
Afghan national government fashion, but that has only enabled warlords and different 
groups to vie for control and power and undermine the central government.  Karzai has 
also struggled to effectively harness the traditional/tribal local governance mechanisms 
due to the existence of warlords, narco-leaders, and the reemergence of the Taliban.  This 
has all caused the general population to lose whatever trust and confidence they initially 
had in the central government.   
4. Cognitive Liberation 
Cognitive liberation existed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, when the 
primary goal was to liberate the country and reestablish a central authority apart from the 
Taliban.  Karzai initially arrived on the scene calling for a Loya Jirga and promising 
national unity.  However, as time went on, Afghanistan largely devolved into the 
factionalism and regional affiliations that existed during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Nationalism quickly became subordinated to ethnic and regional affiliations, and the old 
status quo returned.  Cognitive liberation in terms of a nationalistic vision of Afghanistan 
has all but disappeared, and the international community and locals have all but accepted 
the fractured state that Afghanistan has become.  In fact, the Taliban have crafted an anti-
government narrative that amounts to a counter-cognitive liberation.  In Taliban-
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dominated areas, many Afghans question the permanence of the central government, 
which limits their support often purely out of for fear of reprisals and retaliation by the 
Taliban.   
5. Leadership Team 
Karzai has always lacked a strong leadership team to help him effectively bridge 
all (or most) ethnic and interest groups. While he has delegated some governance tasks to 
a team of close associates, it has rarely been functionally broad or politically 
representative in its composition. Karzai heavily relies on Pashtun powerbrokers for their 
advice about governing and leadership matters.  Several observers point out that Karzai’s 
cabinet and his advisors in the presidential office consist of a “narrow spectrum of 
Pashtuns.”285  He has a mix of educated and westernized Pashtuns, as well as southern 
Pashtun tribal/factional leaders, and has been able to cobble together alliances (both 
formal and informal) based on handouts of appointments, and by turning a blind eye to 
nefarious activities, by several powerbrokers. 286  
The National Assembly, the legislative body, is meant to check the president’s 
power, create laws and approve budgets, and approve the president’s cabinet selections 
(independently versus en bloc).287  In order to establish a sizable bloc of support in the 
National Assembly, Karzai has handed out high-level appointments to likely opponents 
and critics.  This has proven particularly problematic as anti-Karzai blocs have developed 
in the assembly (aligned around former Northern Alliance leaders).288  As president, 
Karzai also appoints district and provincial governors, though generally he has named 
prominent provincial ethnic leaders to the posts, and has consulted with provincial power 
brokers on these selections.289 
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Karzai’s inability to create a cohesive and broad leadership team has become a 
major weakness of his administration.  The longer Karzai has been president, the more he 
has been forced to spend political capital pandering to domestic and regional power 
brokers in order to stay in power.   
6. U.S. Perceptions: Mixed Feelings 
Much like Chalabi and Magsaysay, Karzai’s personality resonated with 
westerners.  The main difference between Karzai and Chalabi in this respect is that 
Karzai’s leadership capital has some grounding with the local population.  While Karzai 
was a good choice for Afghanistan initially, he has failed to live up to the vision that the 
U.S. had for him.  The main tension between Karzai and Washington seems to have 
emerged from differing views on not only how the central government operates, but also 
rampant corruption and graft (to include within Karzai’s family and administration). It is 
clear that Karzai’s strategic vision does not align with that of the U.S.  Arguably, it may 
never have.   
The U.S. initially aimed to dismember al Qaeda and set the conditions to prevent 
their reemergence in the region, as part of the Global War on Terror.  Obama came to 
power claiming that the focused goal for the U.S. towards Afghanistan (and Pakistan) 
was to defeat al-Qaeda,290 though developing an independent and sustainable Afghan 
government was also a priority.  For his part, Karzai has continually reiterated his 
frustrations with foreign military involvement and the effects it is having on civilians.  
Yet, despite his misgivings and his vocal opposition to several U.S. policies in 
Afghanistan, Karzai still has maintained an open dialogue with American officials and 
still supports many aspects of Washington’s strategy in Afghanistan, however reluctantly 
(such as the ALP).  Yet, no matter how adept he has proven at working the traditional 
angles of authority and central governmental control, Karzai has come to symbolize to 
the U.S. and, to many Afghans, corruption and ineffectiveness.  He has lost credibility, 
trust, and his former ability to influence both constituencies.  
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7. Karzai’s Advisors 
One point that has not yet been mentioned in this thesis is the advisor dilemma.  
As president, Karzai has worked with 15 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) 
commanders over the past 12 years (as well as with several U.S. ambassadors to 
Afghanistan).291  In one five year span, between 2007 and 2012, five commanders cycled 
through.292  Though this does not directly pertain to identifying and vetting the right 
indigenous leader, it is worthy of comment.  Compared to Magsaysay, who worked 
exclusively with COL Lansdale (to great effect), both Chalabi and Karzai dealt with 
several advisors/handlers.  At the very least, this lack of continuity had to result in 
shifting policy, diminished institutional memory on environmental and situational 
nuances, and lags as trust needed to be reestablished between advisor and leader.  At 
worst, such churn at any level allows leaders to “pull fast ones” on new advisors and take 
advantage of their naivety about the situation.  Though new advisors potentially bring 
new ideas and a fresh perspective, an advisor cannot develop a deep understanding and a 
reciprocal relationship of trust given such frequent rotations.   
8. Effects of Backing Karzai 
Afghanistan is a messy and decentralized environment in terms of security and 
governance.  Despite his recent fall from grace, Hamid Karzai has ushered in a new 
chapter in Afghanistan history, pulling the country out of 20-plus years of chaos and 
holding democratic elections.  Perhaps this was not lost.  Certainly, Karzai has proved to 
be more successful as a resistance leader than president.  This may be due to many of the 
environmental effects that existed prior to his rise, which could be insurmountable for 
any leader.   
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E. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
The case study presented in this chapter offers an example of how messy working 
with indigenous leaders can become, especially in a country as conflicted and war-torn as 
Afghanistan.  There were initially limited Pashtun leadership choices, the environment 
was chaotic and unstable, and the U.S. misread the environment and arguably missed 
several opportunities.  Our analysis suggests that Karzai was the right individual to lead 
the insurgent movement in the south and to unite all of Afghanistan under one national 
government.  Karzai is an insider who understands the cultural and historic dynamics of 
Afghanistan.  He has been involved with Afghan politics for his entire adult life.  Even 
without a strong, representative leadership team, he initially managed to bridge the gap 
between disparate indigenous groups that have traditionally been at odds.   
However, over time, much of this broad support was lost as the central 
government failed to subdue the power of regional/local influencers, as well as failed to 
project good governance and the rule of law to rural areas throughout the country.  
Karzai’s lack of a cohesive and representative leadership team has exacerbated other 
systemic problems such as corruption and warlordism.  While he worked well with the 
international community between 2001 and 2005, the realities on the ground quickly led 
Karzai to fall back on traditional means to cement his role as president and his ability to 
at least maintain nominal control over the country.   
Over time, Karzai’s government has lost the trust of the indigenous population as 
well as of international partners.  In sum, the decision to work with Karzai was based on 
a narrow and myopic leadership analysis that ultimately failed to factor in the socio-
cultural and political intricacies of Afghanistan.  Had these factors been better 
understood, the U.S. may have better understood the environment and developed more 
realistic expectations of Karzai and the national government.  Finally, selecting a good 
insurgent leader does not guarantee a robust political leader who can build a nation.  
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Taken collectively, the opening vignette and the case studies presented point to 
the difficulties in selecting and vetting an indigenous leader, difficulties that exist 
whether working at the local level or at the national level.   Based on the authors’ 
experiences at the local level and the research presented, a crucial step in non-lethal 
targeting is to correctly identify, select, and vet a potential indigenous leader-partner.  If 
the analysis is correctly done, this will drive the operational planning for how to recruit 
and empower a viable indigenous partner.  The proposed heuristic is meant to help 
operators identify the elements in a successful selection process. 
Before an operator arrives in the field, exhaustive static social network mapping 
and ethnographic research should be undertaken.  Understanding the human domain 
intimately will shorten the time required to begin assessing potential partners.  Structural 
social network mapping, which requires in-depth analysis, helps operators shorten their 
list of potential leader-partnership options by “selecting in” and “selecting out” potential 
leader candidates.  With a deep understanding of the local context and ethnographic data, 
the operator will be able to interpret and assess an individual’s viability as a leader in 
relation to his potential constituency. 
Step 2 is to verify and vet the kinds of authority that candidates possess.  The 
relational aspects of traditional and legal authority can often be quickly confirmed on 
arrival, but charismatic authority requires an operator’s immersion in the society so he 
can accurately assess the potential partner’s effect on likely followers.  At this stage, the 
assessment is all about selecting out inappropriate individuals.  
The operator next needs to consider an individual’s leadership capital combined 
with personality aspects such as confidence, ability to synthesize information, 
communication skills, education, ability to work within the local context, and whether he 
can assemble a helpful leadership team.  The operator will need to weigh not only what 
the potential partner says he can accomplish, but whether the partner’s vision is shared by 
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his would-be supporters.  Often these two factors are not aligned, as we saw in the case 
with Chalabi, which should raise an immediate “red flag” for developing or continuing a 
partnership.   
Finally, structural and environmental resources are as important as the personal 
resources of the would-be leader.  Here, the operator can use the political process model 
to gauge whether the right structural/system requirements exist for a would-be leader to 
succeed.  Also critical is the prospective leader’s understanding of existing 
socioeconomic realities since how he addresses these is what will link him to the 
population and vice versa.  The strength and potential of a movement will depend on the 
nature of networks and political opportunities available.  Most importantly, a potential 
partner’s vision needs to resonate with the population and provide cognitive liberation to 
draw in more followers.  For the operator, it is essential that this vision aligns with the 
goals of the U.S.; if not, the partnership will be unstable and possibly futile. 
In the following section, we will use the leadership selection heuristic (LSH), 
initially described in Chapter II, to assess Ahmed Chalabi, Ramon Magsaysay, and 
Hamid Karzai.  It is important to note that the LSH cannot unequivocally identify the 
perfect candidate.  Rather, it helps to facilitate analysis by keying operators to elements 
discussed throughout the thesis.  Additionally, the LSH can be used to see changes over 
time, which is what we have done with Hamid Karzai, comparing Karzai in 2001 with 
Karzai in 2013. 
B. LEADER ASSESSMENTS  
1. Ahmed Chalabi Assessment 
In 2003, Ahmed Chalabi possessed inadequate levels of traditional and 
charismatic authority as a leader.  Chalabi’s detachment from the Iraqi population, as a 
result of his exile, degraded what influence his familial position may have lent him.  
Chalabi exuded charisma, particularly to his international benefactors, but this did not 
translate into charismatic authority as far as Iraqis were concerned.  He also had low 
degrees of leadership capital. 
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Figure 4 displays a completed leadership selection heuristic (LSH) for Chalabi.    
 
Figure 4.  Ahmed Chalabi LSH 
There is no doubt that Chalabi possessed an influential personality, but he did not 
have what it takes to lead a movement.  Chalabi’s other intangible personal qualities may 
have suited him to be part of a leadership team.  However, he did not possess the 
leadership authority or leadership capital necessary to serve as the leader.   
Most importantly, Chalabi’s vision did not resonate with the Iraqi population.  He 
continually displayed an inability to muster broad support for his movement, which 
should have indicated his inability to grow support for his movement and his lack of a 
strong connection with the population.  Finally, his vision was divergent from that if the 
United States.  In-depth analysis indicates that he agreed with the United States regarding 
regime change in Iraq, but viewed this as a means to achieve political power for himself 
following regime change.   
 84 
2. Ramon Magsaysay Assessment 
Ramon Magsaysay offers an excellent contrast to Ahmed Chalabi.  Magsaysay 
possessed high degrees of legal and charismatic authority and an adequate level of 
traditional/relational authority.  Magsaysay’s position as Secretary of Defense allowed 
him to make structural changes in the government to yield more professional employment 
of the military.  His leadership capital endeared him to members of the military and to the 
population.  Also, his social leadership capital assisted him in manufacturing political 
coalitions, which resulted in a unified front against the Huks.  His approach differentiated 
him from other members of the elite who were viewed as corrupt by the population. 
Figure 5 represents a completed leadership selection heuristic for Magsaysay. 
 
Figure 5.  Ramon Magsaysay LSH 
Magsaysay’s greatest strengths were his understanding of his environment and 
how to take advantage of opportunities.  His modest upbringing provided him with an 
intimate understanding of the socioeconomic issues and public grievances that fueled the 
Huk Rebellion, and his education allowed him to effectively act as a bridge between the 
educated elite and the population.  Magsaysay was adept at political maneuvering, which 
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helped him to identify and take advantage of political opportunities.  His legal authority 
allowed him to reshape the military to neutralize political antagonists and build a 
supportive indigenous network within the military and the population that helped to build 
momentum for his movement.  Magsaysay’s efforts to combat government corruption 
and represent the population provided an alternative to the Huks.  His vision of a 
government that represented the people, when combined with operational victories 
against the Huks, led to overwhelming support for the government.  His desire for a 
democratic, capitalist Philippines aligned with the United States’ national interests.  
Magsaysay’s selection for partnership proved to be an excellent choice and developed 
into long term success. 
3. Hamid Karzai Assessment 
Hamid Karzai provides a unique case when compared to that of Ahmed Chalabi 
or Ramon Magsaysay.  He was chosen for partnership first as a leader against the Taliban 
in 2001, and then served as the leader of Afghanistan for 12 years.  The following two 
LSH charts assess his potential as a partner in 2001 and then reassess him based on his 
conduct as President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2013.  One clearly sees 
how the value of a partnership can change depending on changes in a dynamic 
environment. 
a. Karzai (2001) 
Hamid Karzai possessed a high degree of traditional authority as the head 
of the Popalzai tribe.  He lacked legal authority as the result of not possessing a position 
within the Taliban government, which at the time ruled most of Afghanistan.  Although 
Karzai possessed high levels of charisma after the fall of the Taliban, he initially only 
possessed a small degree of charismatic authority when it came to motivating resistance 
against the Taliban.  His degree of charismatic authority eventually rose after his 
perceived victory against the Taliban during his southern campaign, when Taliban forces 
where defeated in Uruzgan and Kandahar Provinces.  Tactical victories by his force 
against the Taliban, with extensive support from U.S. forces, created momentum for his 
movement, which assisted in attracting members. 
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Figure 6 represents the initial leadership selection heuristic evaluation for Karzai 
for 2001. 
 
Figure 6.  Hamid Karzai (2001) LSH 
Hamid Karzai’s greatest strengths came from his high degree of leadership 
capital and other personal qualities.  His elevated traditional role provided him with in-
depth cultural understanding of Afghanistan, particularly about the Pashtun tribal belt in 
southern Afghanistan.  His past experience, both within government and as a tribal 
leader, allowed him to resonate both with the international community and with tribal 
leaders within Afghanistan.  Most importantly, he was the most influential Pashtun leader 
fighting against the Taliban who also had broad appeal to unite and gain acceptance from 
non-Pashtun ethnic minorities (Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara) in Afghanistan. 
The environment in Afghanistan was advantageous to Hamid Karzai’s 
efforts in 2001.  The Taliban’s enforcement of strict adherence to its view of Islam had 
alienated large portions of the Afghan population.  Karzai’s efforts to overthrow the 
Taliban aligned well with the United States’ retaliatory attacks against both the Taliban 
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and al Qaeda.  The American attacks against the Taliban provided Karzai the political 
and physical maneuver room in which to develop a network to challenge the Taliban’s 
rule.  He was able to link resistance groups against the Taliban, even though his 
indigenous network in Afghanistan was limited and existed primarily as a 
tribal/informational network.  Most beneficial of all, Karzai provided a more attractive 
alternative than any other.  The cognitive liberation that Karzai provided, calling for a 
Loya Jirga, and the national symbolism he used resonated with both the international 
community and with Afghans. 
b. Karzai (2013) 
Hamid Karzai faces a much different environment in 2013 than he did in 
2001 as a result of being a state leader who oversaw the dramatic transition of a country 
that went from 20-plus years of war to becoming a democratic state.  His personal 
resource indicators have altered in response to the changing environment he helped create 
and the position he fills.  He maintains strong traditional authority among the tribal 
leaders of Afghanistan thanks to his status as the khan of the Popalzai tribe.  Legally, as 
the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, he possesses the ability to affect 
change throughout Afghanistan by directly appointing district and provincial leaders.  
However, the high degree of legal authority he could have is tempered by the 
decentralized, tribal rule that still exists in much of the country.  Throughout rural 
Afghanistan, tribal decisions still usually outweigh the central government’s influence.  
Karzai has seen a significant degradation of his charismatic authority, which has resulted 
from the population’s reduced expectations and loss of trust in his administration.  
Compared to 2001, his ability to generate popular support for action has weakened, and 
his power outside of Kabul is largely contingent on relationships he has with local 
powerbrokers.   




Figure 7.  Hamid Karzai (2013) LSH 
In 2001, Hamid Karzai’s leadership capital was one of his most positive 
attributes.  However, this drastically changed by 2013.  He still maintains a high degree 
of cultural understanding, but has lost social and symbolic capital.  Karzai’s balancing of 
foreign policy posturing with the international community and messaging to foster 
domestic support have often worked at cross-purposes.  His relationship with his 
international supporters, particularly in the United States, has been especially turbulent 
since around 2007.  This has resulted in his administration expending political capital 
both internationally and domestically, as well as playing into Taliban and other power 
brokers’ narratives regarding the ineffectiveness of the central government.  The most 
drastic change has been to Karzai’s image as a unifying leader.  His administration has 
been tarnished by corruption, nepotism, and an inability to deliver development and 
justice in Afghanistan.   
Karzai’s personal qualities remain unchanged.  But his ability to improve 
people’s understanding of the local context and his communication skills have degraded 
as a result of perceptions that he has misplayed political opportunities.  The appointment 
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of corrupt and/or ineffective district and provincial governors has stirred dissatisfaction.  
Karzai’s political maneuvering to appease regional powerbrokers often is viewed as his 
lending support to local strong men, though by doing so he is building coalitions and 
solidifying efforts against the Taliban.  His lack of a strong leadership team prevents him 
from consolidating his efforts and forces him to spend political capital both domestically 
and in the foreign policy arena.  Although eschewing a strong leadership team may have 
been necessary while creating the government to prevent internal power struggles, it has 
since become a detriment.  Having a strong deputy for domestic policy might have let 
Karzai focus internationally and could have protected him from appearing to be venal and 
corrupt. 
The broader environment is much different today than it was in 2001, and 
it is ever changing.  Socioeconomic grievances have likewise changed.  Once Afghans 
had been liberated from Taliban rule in 2001, they desired good governance and 
development.  The government has shown a profound inability to provide these.  Fears 
about the return of the Taliban plague efforts by the Karzai administration.  Also, the 
Afghan population, particularly in the south, remains hesitant to overwhelmingly support 
the government out of fear that the Taliban will retaliate should they return to power. 
c. Comparing Karzai (2001) to Karzai (2013) 
Several points must be considered when comparing our two assessments 
of Karzai.  Karzai was originally selected as a resistance and interim leader.  Initially the 
United States and Karzai’s goals were much more closely aligned.  Karzai’s election as 
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan increased his need to meet the wishes of 
his domestic audience.  This changed the relationship dynamic between the U.S. and 
Karzai.  The U.S.’s strategy in Afghanistan is to defeat al Qaeda and extremists.  The 
U.S.’s survival does not depend on Afghan domestic support; Karzai’s does.  Karzai’s 
appointment as president merits that he be reassessed in that position.  He did well on the 
LSH as an interim and resistance leader.   But when we assess him as a potential head of 
state, his attractiveness as a leader decreases dramatically.  Karzai’s example highlights 
that situations change and the person who is initially a good fit may not be a good fit as a 
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partner later on.  However, that said, he may also remain the best available option at the 
moment.  Ideally, additional LSHs would be conducted to compare Karzai to another 
potential partner in Afghanistan.   
4. The Importance of the Advisor 
Apart from the observations made using the LSH, another key takeaway to be 
drawn from the case studies is the negative effects of using multiple advisors and how 
this may have impacted the outcomes with Chalabi and Karzai.  As the Magsaysay 
example suggests, selecting the right advisor and maintaining continuity through that 
advisor may contribute greatly to a leader’s success.  As the only advisor to Magsaysay at 
the national level, Lansdale was able to recognize that Magsaysay was the right 
individual to work with, thanks to his deep understanding of the environment and the 
different players.  Once he began to work with Magsaysay, Lansdale was able to 
effectively provide assistance and guidance, and act as a sounding board for Magsaysay’s 
ideas.  Perhaps just as importantly, he was with Magsaysay until the Huk rebellion was 
subdued.   Contrast this with Karzai, who has had a parade of U.S. and ISAF advisors.  
He has had no one with whom to consistently de-conflict efforts or who fully appreciates 
the nuances of the situation and all the different players.  This lack of continuity may 
very well have impacted the current outcome in Afghanistan.  Or, as in Chalabi’s case, 
we also see how a leader can exploit the lack of a single counterpart or advisor to “work 
the system” for himself.   
C. CONCLUSION 
2013—Now in command of a Special Forces company, newly promoted Major 
Steele finds himself deployed to the same country where he had served as an ODA 
commander.  The province his company deployed to has not progressed in terms of a 
solid local partnership and, as a result, security and development are shaky, and the 
population is not accepting of the central government.  Learning from his past 
experiences with Haji Halim, Steele had developed a plan to approach selecting and 
vetting potential leaders to work with in his area of operation.   
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His company intelligence section works closely with the intelligence sergeants on 
each of the ODAs to conduct static social mapping of the several areas where the teams 
are operating.  They use survey data, personal interviews, and historic ethnographic data 
in order to develop situational understanding.  Thanks to this effort, Steele’s company 
has a fair grasp of who the key players are, as well as the tribal and other social factors 
at play.  In most of the ODAs’ areas, there are several individuals who are selected by 
the company as possible leaders to partner with.  This effort is methodical and takes 
several weeks to complete.  But, Steele’s company identifies possible targets for influence 
and his teams understand the dynamics of the environment that they are working in.  His 
ODAs next conduct an assessment of these potential leaders against the LSH to vet the 
suitability of each individual. 
Through the selection and vetting process that Steele’s company uses, each team 
narrows down its search to a single leader.  Some of the selections come as no surprise, 
as several are prominent tribal khans who already have a visible following, as well as 
relatively homogenous tribal make-ups in their areas.  However, in several areas, no 
such strong choice is evident.  These areas have complicated tribal dynamics and many 
of the traditional leaders are absent, as they were in the area that Haji Halim operated.  
There are also several other system strains, such as the heavy presence of illegitimate 
warlords, insurgents, and/or narco-trafficers.  However, through using the LSH to 
carefully guide their decision-making process, each team identifies an individual who has 
several of the desired personal resources, and the team understands that the environment 
presents several of the desired structural resources and, importantly, there is initially at 
least a small level of reciprocity between the potential leader and the population.  Steele 
has thus far avoided the mistakes he made with Haji Halim of misjudging the individual 
and the environment.   
Indeed, four months into the partnering efforts, Steele is pleased with the results.  
Unlike his experiences with Haji Halim, there have been no major surprises for any of 
the ODAs.  The populations of the areas seemed to recognize the leaders’ authority, and 
the leaders have listened to Steele’s advice about developing leadership teams that 
represent the diverse interest groups in their areas.  Security is improving and public 
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sentiment is shifting away from the insurgency.  Though progress is slow in several 
areas, Steele’s teams are working vigorously to bolster the population’s commitment to 
the leaders the company chose to partner with.  Steele is sure that because care was 
taken in selecting and vetting the right individuals there is now less uncertainty to deal 
with in creating a more secure and stable environment locally.  The next step: ensure that 
the right leaders at the district and provincial level exist to partner with as well.   
The LSH can be a valuable tool for assessing leaders to partner with, from the 
local to the national level.  Based on our combined experiences, we believe that these 
techniques are scalable, and will prove useful in selecting a local leader, regional leader, 
or national leader.  We also believe that these processes are applicable across the full 
spectrum of Irregular or Unconventional Warfare.  In closing, we would simply reiterate 
that the key to creating and maintaining a multi-level partnership network for influence 
depends first on identifying the right individual(s), and then vetting their potential for 
long term partnering.   
The development and use of a non-lethal targeting process, such as MIDEA 
(mentioned in Chapter I and Appendix B), has the potential to link partnership operations 
from the state down to the lowest leader level, and should be used and synchronized at 
and between each echelon.  Such a non-lethal targeting approach requires further 
development and validation, but in our view such a non-lethal, influence-based process is 
necessary for future U.S. military operations.  The selection and vetting method outlined 
in this thesis needs to play a major part in such a process.    
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APPENDIX A. PERSONAL RESOURCES AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
This appendix offers an in-depth overview of each of the social movement theory 
topics discussed in Chapter II. 
A. PERSONAL RESOURCES 
1. Max Weber’s Tenets of Authority 
Max Weber’s theory on authority offers a foundational framework from which to 
draw when identifying and vetting a movement leader.  According to Kenneth Allen, 
Weber’s concepts of authority are based on legitimacy, which includes socialization and 
the internalization of cultural norms and values, and therefore requires low levels of 
external social control (or coercion).293  Weber’s three types of authority are traditional-
cultural, rational-legal, and charismatic.  Though Weber identifies “pure” categories of 
authority, in reality legitimate authority may exist as a mixture of these categories.294 
Traditional-cultural authority is based on followers’ beliefs in time and custom, 
which are hinged on honoring the past.295  This type of authority, often manifested in the 
role of a “chief,” is found predominantly in traditional, tribal cultures; usually passed 
down (oftentimes hereditarily), based on personal loyalty; and hinges on an individual’s 
(or individuals’) authority by virtue of traditional status and a population’s 
“…traditionally transmitted rules.”296  As long as a leader’s actions follow the 
population’s “…substantive ethical common sense, of justice, or of utilitarian 
expediency” and do not overstep traditional limitations obedience by the population is 
often unlimited.297 
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Rational-legal authority is based on followers’ beliefs in procedure, or an 
individual’s appointed bureaucratic role or position.298  People see leaders as having the 
legal right to lead by virtue of their leadership position and in accordance with normative 
rules.299   A population’s obedience comes through adherence to these rules and rights, 
which manifest in a system of uniform principles, norms, and/or laws.300  Important to 
note, this type of authority is not based on allegiance to an individual, but rather upon 
deference to the position and order within the established system.301 
Charismatic authority is based on “devotion to the specific and exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person…” and the normative 
order s/he establishes.302  Individuals with charismatic authority are followed based on 
their followers’ voluntary devotion.303  This form of authority, though the only pure form 
of legitimacy according to Weber, is not formal or lasting.304   A leader must continually 
perform “…miracles and heroic deeds” in order to secure authority and control over a 
population; failure to live up to this status leads to a loss of influence over followers.305  
The relationship that a leader with charismatic authority has with his constituents is key.  
Many theorists have inadvertently fallen into a reductionist trap in terms of 
misidentifying individuals with a charismatic personality as having charismatic 
authority. 306  Also, making charismatic authority routine is difficult, if not impossible, to 
maintain and/or pass on, and charismatic authority often transforms into, or co-exists 
with, another form of authority.307 
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2. Nepstal and Bob’s “Leadership Capital” 
Nepstal and Bob characterize the “Leadership Capital” into three sub-categories: 
cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital.  Individuals who rise to movement 
leadership positions and effectively lead movements possess substantial levels of 
leadership capital, in one or more forms of these.308  A key point that Nepstal and Bob 
make is that leaders do not have to possess all three of these leadership capital 
characteristics.309  
Cultural capital entails a leader’s “…knowledge, skills, and abilities…” to 
influence the target community and external parties, including having a firm grasp of 
local practices and value systems.310  Cultural capital can also be further segmented into 
“localized cultural capital,” “universalistic cultural capital,” and “transcultural skills.”311  
Localized cultural capital refers to a leader possessing and transmitting an understanding 
of the circumstances and experiences that his followers and would-be followers 
endure.312  Universalistic cultural capital is an important trait to have in order for a leader 
to be able to reach a broad public, and includes understanding the larger “…values, 
sympathies, cultural principles and political trends…” in addition to possessing personal 
attributes such as media skills, strong rhetoric, and an innate ability to exploit 
opportunities in the political arena.313  Transcultural skills involve a leader’s capacity to 
effectively express ideas to disparate audiences, specifically being able to appeal to 
movement constituents and outside backers.314  Cultural capital’s relevance is best 
illustrated through concept of frame alignment by Snow et al. in which movements align 
their efforts and goals with those of larger clusters, thereby using public sentiment to 
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recruit participants and adherents in order to mobilize the population at large toward the 
movement’s goals.315 
Social capital involves having “strong ties to activist communities and weak ties 
to broader mobilizing networks.”316  This type of capital involves examining social 
networks, along with the “norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness” associated with 
them.317  Strong ties correlate with face-to face interactions, relationships, and locations 
where a leader directly connects with followers.318  Weak ties, also referred to as 
brokerage ties or intermediary ties, link a leader to a larger pool of followers through 
trusted intermediaries placed throughout the network (who themselves have strong ties to 
lower level networks and groups).319  These weak ties are important for validating 
leaders across the broader network, for disseminating critical information and guidance, 
and for recruiting individuals and groups to the movement.320  As Mark Granovetter 
points out, weak ties are indispensable to integrate individuals into larger communities 
and are imperative for tying disparate groups/networks together into a cohesive 
movement.321 
Symbolic capital consists of personal charisma, respect, social prestige, and moral 




                                                 
315 David A Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51 
(1986): 465, accessed June 4, 2013, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2095581.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true. 
316 Nepstad and Clifford Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter?,” 4, 5. 




321 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78 no. 6 
(May 1973), accessed September 12, 2013, 
http://sociology.stanford.edu/people/mgranovetter/documents/granstrengthweakties.pdf. 
322 Nepstad and Clifford Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter?,” 5. 
 97 
authority, though it can also reinforce or strengthen other forms of authority.  Nepstal and 
Bob point out that this form of capital is useful when building a constituency, as well as 
for developing followers’ trust in a leader.323 
3. Leadership Teams 
According to the social movement literature, movements that are led by teams 
comprising of both insiders and outsiders have higher rates of success.324 Barker et al. 
find that leadership teams with the ability to respond creatively to complex situations (or 
that have high strategic capacity) are often better and more disparately networked.325  
They also earn acceptance by conducting regular deliberations with varied 
constituencies.”326  Marshall Ganz further argues that “effective strategy is usually the 
product of a ‘leadership team’ rather than an individual leader, and… diverse leadership 
teams increase strategic capacity.”327 
4. Education Capital 
Morris and Staggenborg write that “[t]o be successful, social movements require 
that a myriad of intellectual tasks be performed extremely well.”328   They point out that 
successful movement leaders are more likely to possess formal education, often afforded 
by growing up in more affluent households (relative to the general population).329  
Education is often important given the number of tasks that leaders are required to 
perform, including “framing grievances and formulating ideologies, debating, interfacing 
with media, writing, orating, devising strategies and tactics, creatively synthesizing 
information gleaned from local, national and international venues, dialoguing with  
 
                                                 
 323 Ibid., 5. 
324 Erickson Nepstad and Clifford Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter?,” 38. 
325 Barker, “Leadership Matters: An Introduction,” 19. 
326 Ibid., 19. 
327 Morris and Staggenborg, “Leadership in Social Movements,” 181. 
328 Ibid., 175. 
329 Ibid. 
 98 
internal and external elites, improvising and innovating, developing rationales for 
coalition building and channeling emotions…[and] manipulation of language and other 
symbols.”  330 
B. THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
1. Socioeconomic Factors: Grievances and Agency 
Broad socio-economic factors can be used to incite and grow a social movement 
against a state.  Discontentment with the status quo helps a social movement begin to 
draw support away from the state and towards the movement.  Understanding the socio-
economic issues and grievances of the population is critical to the survival of a social 
movement, and particularly to its progression toward revolution.  Peoples’ attitudes 
directly affect the movement’s ability to attract sympathizers and full participants.331  
However, this shift is not always automatic. Leveraging or accentuating existing 
collective discontent requires agency.  Some leaders with a high degree of cultural and 
social resonance must translate objective conditions into a systemic critique of the state.  
A leader’s ability to identify bargaining positions and expanding opportunities for 
collective action depend on how effectively he understands the underlying socioeconomic 
issues and their subsequent effects on the population.   
Framing socioeconomic conditions is also relational as they encompass a broad 
spectrum of affected groups.  Race, gender, class, religion, and economic factors all 
affect the perception of the population’s understanding of the status quo, and several of 
these factors coexist and affect each other.332  The ability to understand these 
relationships is inherently more difficult for an outsider than for someone whose is  
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actively a part of the society.  It is important for a would-be leader to be cognizant of the 
factors to relate to the society as a whole and identify political opportunities in order to 
take advantage of grievances.   
2. Political Opportunities: Political and Structural Resources and 
Agency 
Recognizing and using emerging political opportunities is necessary to create the 
operational space in which a movement can grow.  Developing political opportunities can 
“…facilitate increased political activism on the part of the excluded groups, either by 
seriously undermining the stability of the entire political system or by increasing the 
political leverage of a single insurgent group.”333  The presence of political opportunities 
and their potential effects vary and change over time.  The state’s inability, or reluctance, 
to adapt to the evolving political environment will prevent the state from maintaining 
absolute control over the political environment and will diminish its ability to counter the 
social movement.   
Political instability disrupts the status quo and encourages all organized groups to 
challenge the state, hereby creating friction that assists in the establishment of a new 
political order.334  Successful social movements, and follow-on revolutions, are created 
“out of broad social processes that strengthened the political position of the challenging 
group.”335  The social movement’s ability to survive increases as its political strength 
grows; the movement gains credibility, reduces the power gap between itself and its 
opponents, and gains political leverage against the state the longer it proves able to take 
advantage of political opportunities.336 
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3. Indigenous Organizational Strength: Relational Resources and 
Agency 
The organization relies on itself to recruit new members and to strengthen the 
logistical system it requires in order to operate.  McAdams points out, “[i]t is the 
resources of the minority community that enable… [movement] groups to exploit these 
opportunities.”337  In other words, the network’s ability to collect and redistribute 
resources determines its survivability.  Similarly, Oberschall points out, “[i]f no network 
exists, the aggrieved population is capable of little more than ‘short-term,’ localized, 
ephemeral outbursts and movements of protest such as riots.”338  A social movement’s 
longevity depends on an indigenous infrastructure that acts as a bridging mechanism 
linking groups together into an organized campaign of resistance.339 
Identifying the political beliefs of preexisting groups allows for political 
maneuvering and reframing of the narrative to recruit additional groups.  The recruitment 
and co-option of entire groups results in bloc recruitment and stimulates rapid growth for 
the social movement.340  Rapid mobilization and the continued participation by members 
“occurs as a result of recruiting blocs of people who are already highly organized and 
participants.”341  Bloc recruitment not only expands the physical size of the movement, 
but also rapidly increases its communication network by making use of the 
communication networks of the newly recruited groups. 
The social movement itself should possess a multi-layered structure.  Those at 
leadership level need to be able to position himself where they can operate free from 
selected targeting by opponents.  The protection of the leadership requires that there be 
communication cells, or “connective tissue,” to link the operation cells with the 
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leadership.342  The communication cells deliver strategic guidance and spread 
information to multiple operational cells.  The connective tissue should have certain 
redundancies built in to protect leaders and members alike.  
4. Cognitive Liberation: Cultural Resources and Agency 
Cognitive liberation of the population is arguably the most important objective for 
the social movement.  Leaders of the movement must make an effort to modify the 
population’s perception of the status quo in order render the movement’s resistance 
worthwhile.  For Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, this cognitive awakening 
consists of three important elements:  First, the current system needs to be made to lose 
legitimacy. 343   Second, perceptions about the longevity of the system need to be 
attacked to stimulate the desire for change. 344   Third, the population needs to believe 
that it can change its situation and is not helpless against the establishment or status 
quo.345  The cognitive liberation of the population will stimulate recruitment and solidify 
gains, thereby creating momentum for the social movement.  
The social movement’s narrative needs to assign blame for current socioeconomic 
problems and simultaneously offer an alternative for a better future.  The responsibility 
for the population’s grievances should be pinned on those in power.  Examples of 
corruption and nepotism should be used as rallying points for the injustice of the status 
quo.  The future as envisioned by the social movement should be vague.  There should be 
no firm promises that the enemy can then counter-attack as unfulfilled or as having led to 
failure. 
Initially, the movement will be a weaker position than that of its opponent.  But 
by taking advantage of developing political opportunities, it should be able to improve its 
bargaining position and creates more chances to pursue collective action.  Its improved 
position should then raise “significantly the costs of repressing the insurgent 
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action[;]…[r]epression of the group involves increased risks of political reprisals than 
before and is thus less likely to be attempted even in the face of an increased threat to 
members’ interests.”346   
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 103 
APPENDIX B. MIDEA NON-LETHAL TARGETING PROCESS 
This appendix provides a brief overview of the five steps of the “MIDEA” non-
lethal targeting process, as proposed in Chapter I.  We believe that adjusting the way that 
the targeting process focuses on population-influencing efforts in irregular and 
unconventional warfare settings, will enhance the understanding of military commands. 
The tactical through the strategic level and, as a result, improve their ability to affect 
complex environments in their favor. 
A. STEP 1: MAP HUMAN/ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE & TERRAIN  
This step coincides with the traditional “Decide” phase of targeting.  This step 
should result in a robust understanding of the political and social networks/groups, as 
well as the political and social factors at play in a given area.  According to FM 3-60, 
“[The Decide phase] provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence 
collection and attack planning…[and] draws heavily on a detailed intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and continuous assessment of the situation.”347  There 
are multiple things to be considered when trying to understand the operating 
environment.  Using historical ethnographies may provide a starting point for assessing 
social and cultural factors that shape the society/system.  Conducting surveys and face-to-
face interviews to collect data for social network analysis can also help with 
understanding the system players and dynamics.  As Anna Simons points out, 
understanding a cultural system involves a delicate balance of understanding social 
structures, social relationships and organizations, and paying attention to personal 
exchanges.348   
                                                 
347 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60, The Targeting Process 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), 2-2. 
348 Anna Simons, “Understanding ‘Culture,’” In Gangs & Guerrillas: Ideas From Counterinsurgency 
and Counterterrorism (NPS-DA-11-001), ed. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein (Naval Postgraduate 
School Technical Report, Monterey, CA, 2011, 41–42. 
 104 
B. STEP 2: IDENTIFY PEOPLE OR GROUPS TO TARGET  
In order to be able to influence a population appropriately, units must identify 
focal individuals or groups within the population to leverage.  This step also falls within 
the traditional “Decide” phase of targeting.  According to FM 3-24:  
Intelligence personnel provide information on the relative importance of 
different target personalities and areas and the projected effects of lethal 
and nonlethal engagement…intelligence analysts need to identify 
individuals and groups to engage as potential…supporters, targets to 
isolate from the population, and targets to eliminate.349   
As this thesis suggests, identifying and vetting the right leader(s) represents a critical 
step, specifically in terms of first identifying a group to influence and then searching for 
the best person(s) to lead it. 
C. STEP 3: DESIGN A STRATEGY TO INFLUENCE PEOPLE OR GROUPS 
This step falls into the traditional “Detect” phase of the targeting cycle.  As 
mentioned in FM 3-24, “Intelligence regarding the perceptions and interests of the 
populace requires particular attention…[i]t is also important for developing political, 
social, and economic programs.”350  The goal here is to develop a strategy that triggers or 
feeds a collective effort within the population to support the selected leader, who in turn 
will work to remedy key causes/issues that are negatively affecting the population.  The 
goal is also to develop, reinforce, and/or strengthen legitimate governance, whether at the 
local or national level.  As explained in this thesis, we believe this can be done by 
supporting the right leader and leveraging available assets to reinforce the leader’s 
influence over the population.   
D. STEP 4: EMPLOY MEASURES TO INFLUENCE PEOPLE OR GROUPS 
This step occurs during the “deliver” phase of D3A.  Efforts undertaken should 
focus on empowering leaders and influencing chosen population segments; in a 
                                                 
349 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 5-29. 
350 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 5-30. 
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counterinsurgency environment, efforts should be made to tie the leader to the 
government whenever possible.  Every action should be undertaken with an end-state in 
mind and with the aim of creating stability as the status quo is overturned. 
This effort requires seamless interaction and collaboration among civil and 
military organizations, staff and battlefield operating systems (BOS) (such as fires, 
intelligence, operations, civil affairs, etc.), and host nation and international forces in a 
targeting working group.351  All organizations and sub-sections need to be integrated and 
share the same objectives and vision, operate toward the same goal, collect similar data, 
and feed it into the same process.   
E. STEP 5: ADJUST THE STRATEGY AS NECESSARY BASED ON 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
This step falls within the “Assess” phase of D3A.  Targeting is a dynamic, 
repetitive, and adaptive process that is based on continuous assessments and situational 
understanding.352  Complex environments may produce unexpected factors.  As such, 
vigilance is necessary to monitor outputs, refine situational understanding, and the 
common operating picture, validate information, readjust strategy, and/or reassess which 
individuals and groups to support and/or target for influence.   
                                                 
351 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 2-3; Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60, The Targeting Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2010), 1-1 and 4-28. 
352 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60, The Targeting Process 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), 2-2 and 5-31. 
 106 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 107 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Allen, Kenneth. Explorations in Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World, 
3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013.  
“Ahmed Chalabi Fast Facts.” CNN. Last modified June 23, 2013. Accessed June 23, 
2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/05/world/meast/ahmed-chalabi-fast-facts.  
Ardolino, Bill and Bill Roggio. “Afghan President orders US Special Forces to leave 
Wardak Province.” The Long War Journal. February 24, 2013. Accessed 
September 9, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 
archives/2013/02/afghan_president_ord.php.  
Baer, Robert. See No Evil. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002.  
Bamford, James. “The Man Who Sold the War.” The Rolling Stone. November 18, 2005. 
Accessed June 28, 2013. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1118-
10.htm.  
Barker, Colin, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, Eds. “Leadership Matters: An 
Introduction.” In Leadership and Social Movements, 1–23. Manchester, England: 
Manchester University Press, 2001.  
Baker, Peter. “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan.” The New York 
Times. December 5, 2009. Accessed October 4, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct. 
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
Barkey, Henri. “What Worked in Kabul Won’t Work in Baghdad.” The Washington Post. 
2001. Accessed August 14, 2013. http://ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/content/what-worked-
kabul-wont-baghdad.  
Blehm, Eric. The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New 
Afghanistan. New York: Harper Collins, 2010. 
Bonin, Richard. Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War. 
New York: Anchor Books, 2011. 
Borger, Julian. “Chalabi Accused of Spy Codes Tip-off to Iran.” The Guardian. June 3, 
2004. Accessed 11 August, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/03/iraq.julianborger.  
Brinkley, Joel. “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan.” World 




Broadwell, Paula and Vernon Loeb. All In: The Education of General David Petraeus. 
New York: Penguin Press, 2012.   
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “The Afghan Surge is Over: So, Did it Work?” Foreign Policy. 
September 25, 2012. Accessed October 4, 2013. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25/the_afghan_surge_is_over?pag
e=0,0.  
“Chronology: Campaign against Terror.” Public Broadcast Station’s (PBS) Frontline. 
Accessed September 3, 2013. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/etc/cron.html.  
Cockburn, Andrew. “The Truth about Ahmed Chalabi.” Counterpunch. May 20, 2004. 
Accessed July 31, 2013. http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0520-14.htm.  
Collins, P. H. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and Politics of 
Empowerment. New York: Routledge, 2000. 
Cornish, Leo S. The United States and the Philippine Hukbalahap Insurrection: 1946–54. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1971. 
Coser, L. A. Masters of Sociological Thought. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1977. 
Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency. 
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006. 
———. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60: The Targeting Process. Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010.  
———. U.S. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05: Special Operations. 
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army 2012. 
Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms. Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010. 
Dobbins, James. After the Taliban. Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2008. 
Ehrenberrg, John, J. Patrice McSherry, Jose Ramon Sanchez, and Caroleen Marji Sayej, 
Eds. The Iraq Papers.. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
Fawn, Rick and Raymond Hinnebusch, Eds. The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. 
London/Boulder, CO: Riener Publishers, 2006. 
 
 109 
Farwell, George. Mask of Asia: The Philippines Today. New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1966. 
Fergusson, James. Taliban: The Unknown Enemy. Cambridge, MA: Da Cappo Press, 
2010. 
Filkins, Dexter. “Where Plan A Left Ahmed Chalabi.” The New York Times. November 
5, 2006. Accessed July 15, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/world/africa/03iht-
web.1103chalabi.3388735.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.  
“Flashback: the 1991 Iraqi Revolt.” British Broadcasting Company (BBC) News. August, 
21 2007. Accessed July 20, 2013. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm.  
Franks, Tommy. American Soldier: General Tommy Franks. New York: Regan Books, 
2004. 
Freeman, Jo. “The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement.” American Journal of 
Sociology 78, no. 4 (1973): 792–811. 
Gopul, Anand. “Karzai Aides, Tribal Leaders say Surge is Wrong Strategy.” The Wall 
Street Journal. December 1, 2009. Accessed October 4, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125960550353170023.html.  
Gordon, Michael and Bernard Trainor. “Dash to Baghdad Left Top Generals Divided.” 
New York Times. March 13, 2006. Accessed August 4, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/middleeast/13command.html?p
agewanted=all&_r=1&.  
Graham-Harrison, Emma. “Hamid Karzai: ‘I Have to Be at the Frontline of Hardship and 
Hard Work.’” The Guardian. February 3, 2013. Accessed September 5, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ feb/03/hamid-karzai-frontline-hardship-
work.  
Granovetter, Mark S. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78, 
no. 6 (May 1973). Accessed September 12, 2013. 
http://sociology.stanford.edu/people/mgranovetter/ documents/ granstrength 
weakties.pdf.  
Greenberg, Lawrence M. The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful 
Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955.Washington DC: U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, 1987. 
Gunter, Michael M. “The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence.” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence 12, no. 4 (1999): 
 110 
135–167. October 29, 2010. Accessed August 20, 2013. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/088506099305124.  
“Hamid Karzai Biography.” Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan. Accessed September 13, 2013.  http://president.gov.af/en/page/1043.  
“Hamid Karzai: Biography.” Accessed September 3, 2013. 
http://www.biography.com/people/hamid-karzai-537356..  
“Hamid Karzai Chronology.” The New York Times. Accessed October 4, 2013. 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/hamid_karzai/index.
html.  
“Hamid Karzai: Fast Facts.” CNN. December 12, 2012. Accessed September 3, 2013. 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/17/world/asia/hamid-karzai---fast-facts.  
Hassan, Hussein. “Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities.” Congressional 
Research Service. March 14, 2007. Accessed July 18, 2013. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/81928.pdf.  
Hilton, Isabel. “Need to build a case for war? Step forward Mr Chalabi.” The Guardian. 
March 5, 2004. Accessed August 12, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/mar/06/iraq.iraq.  
Hussein, Hamid. “Broken Wings—Story of Iraq.” Defense Journal 6, no. 11 (July 2003). 
http://www.defencejournal.com/2003-07/opi-b.htm. 
“Hussein Foes Create Joint Front for a Federal Iraq,” The New York Times. November 2, 
1992. Accessed August 11, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/02/world/hussein-foes-create-joint-front-for-a-
federal-iraq.html.  
“Interview: Captain Jason Amerine.” Public Broadcast Station’s (PBS) Frontline. 
Accessed September 3, 2013. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/amerine.ht
ml.  
Jabar, Faleh. “Why the Uprising Failed.” Middle East Report vol 22. May/June 1992.  
Accessed July 20, 2013. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer176/why-uprisings-failed.  
Jenkins, Joseph C. and Charles Perrow. “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker 
Movements (1946–1972).” American Sociological Review 42, no. 2 (1977): 249–
268. Accessed July 15, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2094604.pdf?acceptTC=true&acceptTC=true
&jpdConfirm=true. 
Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010. 
 111 
“Karzai Welcomes U.S. Troop Withdrawl.” Cable News Network (CNN). June 23, 2011. 
Accessed October 4, 2013. 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/23/afghanistan.karzai/index.html.  
Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. Accessed October 4, 
2013. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561925.  
———. “Report to Congress—Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime” (RL31339). 
March 22, 2002. Accessed July 27, 2013. 
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/crs/020322rl31339.pdf.  
———. “Report to Congress—Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime” (RL31339). 
October 3, 2002. Accessed June 27, 2013. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/14391.pdf.  
Karnow, Stanley. In our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1989. 
Kerkvliet, Benedict J. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977. 
Lachia, Eduardo. The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1971. 
Lansdale, Edward G. In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 1991. 
Laquian, Aprodicio A. Slums are for People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in 
Philippine Urban Community Development. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 
1969). 
Lee, Doowan. “DA3800: Seminar on Social Movements and Unconventional Warfare.” 
Lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2013.  
———. “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare.” Special Warfare 
Magazine 26, no 3 (July 2013): 29–34.  
Leigh, David and BrianWhitaker. “Financial Scandal Claims Hang over Leader in 
Waiting.” The Guardian. April 14, 2003. Accessed July 10, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/14/iraq.davidleigh.  
Lembke, Andrew E. Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines: A Case Study 
of Limited Intervention Counterinsurgency Fort Leavenworth, KS Combined 
Studies Institute Press, 2012. 
 112 
Mason, Edward. “DoD’s Use of Iraqi Exiles.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2006.  
Max Weber: Selections from His Work. Translated and edited by S. M. Miller, York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company New, 1963. 
McAdam, Doug. “Beyond Structural Analysis: Towards a More Dynamic Understanding 
of Social Movements.” Social Movement and Networks. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003.  
———. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
———, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Mills, Nick. Karzai: The Failing of American Intervention and the Struggle for 
Afghanistan. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007. 
Morris, Aldon and Suzanne Staggenborg. “Leadership in Social Movements.” The Wiley 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Edited by David A. Soule, Sarah A. 
Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
Mylroie, Laurie. “Clinton Signs Iraq Liberation Act.” Iraq News. November 1, 1998. 
Accessed July 31, 2013. http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/11/01/981101-in.htm.  
———. “The US and the Iraqi National Congress,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4 
no 3, April 2001. Accessed June 28, 2013. 
http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0104_ir1.htm.  
Nepstad Sharon Erickson and Clifford Bob, “When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on 
Leadership Dynamics in Social Movements,” Mobilization 11 no. 1 (June 2006): 
1-22. 
“Obama break up with Karzai? US considers total Afghanistan pullout.” Russian Times 
News. July 9, 2013. Accessed September 5, 2013. http://rt.com/news/afghanistan-
pullout-karzai-obama-824/.  
Oberschall, Anthony. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1973. 
Odierno, Raymond, James Amos, and William McRaven. “Strategic Landpower: 
Winning the Clash of Wills.” Department of Defense White Paper, May 6, 2013. 




“On the Ground: The Fall of Kandahar,” Public Broadcast Service’s (PBS) Frontline. 
Accessed September 5, 2013. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ground/kandahar.html.  
Packer, George. Assassin’s Gate. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Publishers, 2006. 
Parkin, Fran. Max Weber. New York: Routledge Press, 2002. 
Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. Poor People’s Movements. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979. 
Ponzio, Richard J. “Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peace building in 
Afghanistan.” Global Governance 13 no 2 (April–June 2007): 255–257. Accessed 
on August 27, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800657.  
Rashid, Ahmad. “Why a Forlorn Karzai is Breaking with the West.” Financial Times 




Ricks, Thomas. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. London: The Penguin 
Press, 2006. 
Romulo, Carlos and Gray, Marvin M. The Magsaysay Story. New York: John Rees Press, 
1956. 
Rosenberg, Matthew and Graham Bowley. “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. 
Strategy.” The New York Times. March 7, 2012. Accessed September 9, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/ world/asia/corruption-remains-intractable-
in-afghanistan-under-karzai-government.html?pagewanted=all.  
Roston, Aram. The Man Who Pushed America to War. New York: Nation Books, 2008. 
Rubin, Barnett. “Saving Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs 86 (January–February 2007). 
Accessed August 28, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032211.  
Ryan, Allyn C.RM: A Biographical Novel of Ramon Magsaysay. London: Xlibris, 2007. 
Sanger, David. Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of 
American Power. New York: Random House, 2012. 
Schaff, Alvin H. The Philippine Answer to Communism. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1955. 
Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New 
York: Random House, 1988.  
 114 
Simons, Anna. “Understanding ‘Culture,’” In Gangs & Guerrillas: Ideas from 
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism (NPS-DA-11-001). Edited by Michael 
Freeman and Hy Rothstein, Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report, 
Monterey, CA, 2011. 
Snow, David A, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 
“Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” 
American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–481. Accessed June 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2095581.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=t
rue. 
Stolzaf, Sam. The Iraqi Tribal System. Minneapolis, MN: Two Harbor Press, 2009.  
Stutje, Jan Willem, Ed. Charismatic Leadership and Social Movements: The 
Revolutionary Power of Ordinary Men and Women. New York, Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2012. 
Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Tyler, Raven. “Intervention in Iraq?” Public Broadcast System (PBS) Online News Hour. 
Accessed June 23, 2013. 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/iraq/player4.html.  
Valeriano, Napolean D. and Charles T.R. Bohannan. Counter-Guerilla Operations: The 
Philippine Experience. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 
2006. 
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott 
Parsons. Illinois: Free Press Glencoe, 1947. 
“U.S. Troop Withdrawal: Obama May Speed Up Full Military Pullout from Afghanistan, 
NYT Reports.” Reuters. July 8, 2013. Accessed September 5, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/08/us-troop-withdrawal-from-
afghanistan_n_3564139.html.  
Youssef, Nancy A. “Chalabi Back in Action in Iraq.” McClatchy Newspapers. October 
28, 2007. Accessed August 4, 2013. 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2007/10/28/20893/chalabi-back-in-action-in-
iraq.html.  
Zald, Mayer N. and Robert Ash, “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
